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Recently, a remarkable shift in environmental attitudes has begun to gain
traction. For example, just fifteen years ago, the Supreme Court agreed in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council that coastal property was valueless in its natural condition,
and that the state could not prohibit its development without providing compensation to
the affected landowner. Today, the highest court in at least one state has come to the
opposite conclusion, determining that the development of coastal marshlands would
constitute a public nuisance under state common law. An even more striking shift is
underway in the area of climate change. In early 2005, one U.S. Senator—echoing the
sentiments of many—denounced the threat of catastrophic global warming as “the
greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the American people.” The following year, An
Inconvenient Truth was released, moving Al Gore from the status of unsuccessful
presidential candidate to accidental folk hero (in some quarters) and nominee for the
2007 Nobel Peace Prize. At the same time, a sizeable group of prominent business
leaders began a campaign to encourage Congress to regulate their own industries by
enacting mandatory caps on greenhouse gas emissions. What factors could account for
this remarkable shift? The attached article suggests two responses to that question. First,
as the Lucas Court set forth a new categorical rule of governmental liability for
regulatory takings, it also established a new defense that draws upon the states’ common
law of nuisance and property. That defense has taken on a life of its own— forming what
this article calls the “new nuisance doctrine”—evolving from defense, to offense, to
catalyst for legislative change. Second, in 2005 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita struck New
Orleans and the Gulf Coast of Louisiana and Mississippi. The hurricanes and their
resultant storm surge swept away levees, life, and property. They also shattered our
skepticism that wetlands indeed perform valuable flood control functions, and challenged
our belief that society can continue to emit carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases
into the atmosphere without adverse impact upon the climate, weather patterns, and sea
levels. As expressly contemplated by Lucas, changed circumstances and new learning
should guide courts as they determine the appropriate contours, respectively, of property
rights and the public interest. This article undertakes a survey of such new learning in the
areas of wetland destruction, sprawling land patterns, and global warming. It concludes
by considering the extent to which this new information has been incorporated into the
law of new nuisance.
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INTRODUCTION: FROM NEW PROPERTY TO NEW NUISANCE
In 1992, the United States Supreme Court decided the foundational
modern case on regulatory takings, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.1 In
holding that a state law forbidding construction in certain coastal zones required
compensation, the Court created a new total takings categorical rule, requiring
governments to compensate landowners whenever regulation “deprives land of all
economically beneficial use.”2 Just three years earlier, Hurricane Hugo had struck
the very island in dispute—the Isle of Palms—leading to thirty-five fatalities and
six billion dollars in damage.3 Drawing upon this experience, South Carolina
presented evidence that undeveloped lands provide valuable protection against
coastal storms and hurricanes, and that for “roughly half of the last 40 years, all or
part of [the Lucas] property was part of the beach or flooded twice daily.”4
Rejecting such evidence, the Court accepted the premise that oceanfront lands are
“valueless” in their natural state.5 In so doing, the majority gave little weight to
the state legislature’s finding that coastal development must be regulated to
prevent harm to the community. The Court reasoned, “[because] such a
justification can be formulated in practically every case, this amounts to a test of
whether the legislature has a stupid staff.”6
The Court tempered its new categorical rule with a new defense, planting
the seed for the new nuisance doctrine that is the focus of this article. Under the
Lucas defense, regulations that deprive property of all economically beneficial
use “cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must
inhere in . . . the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”7 In concurrence,
Justice Kennedy provided an important reminder that nuisance law is
fundamentally evolutionary, such that “changed circumstances or new knowledge
may make what was previously permissible no longer so.”8 As a result, “the State
should not be prevented from enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to
changing conditions.”9
1

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).

2

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026-27.

3

See infra Part II.C.

4

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1038-39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

5

505 U.S. at.1003.

6

Id. at 1025 n.12.

7

Id. at 1029.

8

Id. at 1031 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

9

Id. at 1035.
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This article unpacks what I call the new nuisance doctrine, applying it to
the environmental challenges posed by wetland destruction, sprawling
development patterns, and global warming. Overall, Lucas triggered an
unanticipated revitalization of the link between property and torts. By explicitly
measuring the contours of property rights against the evolving backdrop of
nuisance—primarily a tort doctrine—the Court restored an important degree of
flexibility to property rights. Moreover, the Lucas defense weakened the insularity
of property rights, instead balancing the rights of the individual against the
interests of the community. This article suggests that Lucas initiated a revolution
in the way we think about property. Such a change has not been seen, perhaps,
since 1964 when Charles Reich published The New Property—an article that has
been cited more than a thousand times by scholars and jurists.10
My thesis is that the new nuisance doctrine of Lucas has moved from
defense, to offense, to legislative catalyst. As others have noted, Lucas left a
legacy surprisingly favorable to governmental defendants in the form of a new
“categorical” defense.11 I add to this discovery by tracing the spillover effect of
Lucas beyond the bounds of regulatory takings defense, into the realm of
affirmative claims for common law nuisance. That is, as new ecological and other
learning stimulated by Lucas begins to connect the dots between cause and effect,
more aggressive nuisance claims will become viable. Even more far-reaching—as
nuisance liability has become more feasible in growing areas of study such as
global warming—industry leaders themselves have begun to call for uniform,
federal legislation that may limit the uses to which their property can be
employed.12 These are unexpected, pro-regulatory developments, stimulated at
least in part by the purportedly anti-regulatory Lucas decision.
Part I examines the modern property rights movement, with its emphasis
upon individual rights relatively unfettered by public interest regulation. Parts II
and III place the Lucas decision into historical context, delineating periods of
roughly thirty to fifty years during which either private rights or the community
welfare claimed a position of ascendancy.13 The discussion also roots Lucas in a
geophysical context—between the bookends of Hurricane Hugo and Hurricane
Katrina. Noting the continuing vulnerability of the southeastern coastal region to
severe storms, this section ponders whether the Court would decide Lucas
differently today in light of new learning on wetlands, hurricanes, and global
warming. As discussed in Part IV, after Lucas, nuisance law is “new” in two
10

See infra Part III.C.1.

11

See infra Part IV.A. (discussing the work of Professors Michael Blumm, Richard Lazarus, and
others).
12

See infra Part V.C.4.

13

See infra Part II.
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critical respects. First, it has developed from a defense to takings liability into an
offensive claim for common law nuisance, and beyond to a catalyst for legislative
action. Second, nuisance has a new substantive aspect. As the Lucas Court made
clear, the doctrine should evolve in conformity with changed circumstances or
new knowledge.14 Part V considers the applicability of the new nuisance doctrine
to three of the most crucial environmental problems of our time—wetland
destruction, sprawling land patterns, and global warming.
I. THE PROPERTY RIGHTS IMBALANCE
Rights are not the language of democracy. Compromise is what democracy is
about. Rights are the language of freedom, and are absolute because their role is
to protect our liberty. By using the absolute power of freedom to accomplish
reforms of democracy, we have undermined democracy and diminished our
freedom.
The Death of Common Sense: How Law is Suffocating America (1996)15

In a healthy society, there is a rough give-and-take between individual
autonomy and community well-being. For centuries, nuisance law has been
assigned the task of balancing such competing interests, weighing the common
law property rights of individuals against those of the neighboring landowner or
community. More recently, nuisance law has been supplemented (or even
supplanted) with statutes designed to protect the public health, safety, and
welfare, and the environment. Both nuisance law and public interest legislation
are, at their core, enterprises involving balance and compromise.
Increasingly, however, advocates have employed the language of “rights”
to lend moral heft to their side of the scale. In 1985 Professor Richard Epstein laid
the groundwork for expanding the constitutional dimension of property, arguing
that individual rights should be limited by a governmental police power no
broader than the power of eminent domain.16 In 1992, the United States Supreme
14

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003. Justice Steven’s dissenting opinion expanded upon this evolutionary
potential, asserting that a new appreciation of the “importance of wetlands . . . and the
vulnerability of coastal lands shapes our evolving understandings of property rights.” Id. at 106970 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
15

PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA 168
(1996) (condemning modern society as excessively bureaucratic and law-driven). Although the
author’s criticism was directed at what he perceives to be excessive governmental regulation, it
might be applied with equal force to the excesses of modern property rights advocates.

16

See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
332 (1985) (asking “what minimum of additional power . . . must be added for the state to become
more than a voluntary protective association and to acquire the exclusive use of force within its
territory?” and concluding that “the only additional power needed is the state’s right to force
exchanges of property rights [through eminent domain] that leave individuals with rights more
valuable than those they have been deprived of”).
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Court embraced Epstein’s philosophy, at least in part, in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council.17 Critics of Epstein and Lucas assert that “[n]otwithstanding the
typical rhetoric of the takings debate, government officials are defenders of
property rights.”18 Arguing for an evenhanded application the language of
“rights.” these critics contend that “[a]n aggressive use of the Takings Clause to
undermine land use controls does not promote property rights generally, but rather
promotes the property rights of a select few at the expense of the majority of
property owners.”19
Today, the absolutist language of rights—particularly when linked to the
constitutional regulatory takings doctrine—has the potential to stifle the
discussion of important social and environmental policies. As commentators have
warned, unyielding “rights talk” should be used with care to avoid the suppression
of democratic debate.20 Part I surveys the modern property rights movement,
highlighting the techniques it uses to shape public opinion in a manner solicitous
of private landowners and distrustful of public interest regulation. 21
17

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (citing to Epstein’s work for
general propositions of regulatory takings law). Epstein was also one of the authors of a Lucas
amicus brief filed on behalf of the Institute for Justice. See 505 U.S. at 1005. A discussion of
Lucas appears in infra Part II.
18

DOUGLAS KENDALL ET AL., TAKINGS LITIGATION HANDBOOK: DEFENDING TAKINGS
CHALLENGES
TO
LAND
USE
REGULATIONS
9-10
(2000),
available
at
http://communityrights.org/legalresources/Handbook/HBintro.asp (visited Dec. 30, 2005). See
also ELIZABETH BRUBAKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE DEFENCE OF NATURE (1995), available at
www.uexcity.com/environmentprobe/pridon/index.html.
19

KENDALL, supra.

20

See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT
DISCOURSE (1991).

OF

POLITICAL

21

As one who teaches Property in the law school curriculum, I must acknowledge that property
professors may contribute to this distrust of governmental regulation. As another Property
professor has written, the traditional “bundle of sticks” metaphor may discount the value of public
interest regulation:
One individual's interest in land cannot be defined without taking into account
the interests of neighbors and the larger human and natural communities. For
example, filling (or draining) a wetland might be considered a property interest
belonging to the owner of tract on which it lays—a stick in his bundle. Yet in
wiping out the wetland the owner affects drainage on the rest of his land—his
whole bundle of sticks—and may well affect the drainage of his neighbors'
lands, represented by their bundles. . . . [F]rom a social and ecological
perspective, the [bundle of sticks] metaphor presents a false reality, one that
cannot be squared with the values that underlie the present day understanding of
what it means to own land.
Myrl L. Duncan, Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks: Land as a Community-Based Resource, 32
ENVTL. L. 773, 775-76 (2002).
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A.

Supersizing Property Rights

The modern property rights movement is an important social phenomenon,
and it would be little exaggeration to consider it as a manifestation of the
American propensity toward “supersizing.”22 Property rights—particularly those
relating to real property—have expanded in at least three important dimensions.
First, the size of homes has been increasing over time. Between 1987 and
2001, the size of the average new home in the United States increased by over
20%, from 1900 square feet to 2300 square feet.23 By 2003, approximately 20%
of new homes exceeded 3000 square feet in size.24 Simultaneously, household
size has decreased, thereby inflating the average per capita square footage of
homes.25
Second, the profile of property owners has changed over time,
increasingly including individuals with expansive property portfolios
encompassing more than the traditional family home. In 2004, for example,
approximately 38% of the housing stock was used for something other than the
owner’s principal residence.26 Similarly, farms today may be owned by large
agribusinesses, rather than by families: between 1900 and 1990, the average farm

22

The word “supersize” appeared in the 2003-05 edition of WEBSTER’S NEW MILLENNIUM
DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH, defined as a verb meaning “to increase the size of something ordered,
esp. a food item” and as an adjective meaning “extremely large; enormous.” See WEBSTER’S NEW
MILLENNIUM DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH (Barbara Ann Kipfer ed., version 0.9.6 May 5, 2005)
(online edition). The word received considerable media attention when it was used in the title of
Morgan Spurlock’s 2004 documentary, Super Size Me: A Film of Epic Proportions. See A.O.
Scott, Film Review: When All Those Big Macs Bite Back, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2004 (describing
film as an “affable, muckraking documentary”).
23

Jennifer Evans-Cowley, McMansions: Supersized Houses, Supersized Regulations, TERRA
GRANDE, Jan. 2005, available at http://recenter.tamu.edu (citing to 2002 study by the National
Association of Home Builders).
24

This represents an almost 100% increase in large home construction between 1988 (11% of new
homes exceeded 3000 square feet) and 2003 (20% of new homes exceeded 3000 square feet). Id.
(citing to U.S. Census Bureau data).
25

Id. (citing to U.S. Census Bureau data, noting that average household size decreased from 3.11
persons in 1970 to 2.59 persons in 2000).
26

A study by the National Association of Realtors found that the 2004 housing stock consisted of
72.1 million owner-occupied homes, 37.2 million investment units, and 6.6 million vacation
homes. See National Association of Realtors, Second Homes, Mar. 9, 2005, available at
http://www.realtor.org/publicaffairsweb.nsf (visited Dec. 31, 2005). Between 1985 and 1995 (and
as adjusted for inflation), the amount spent on vacation homes alone (as opposed to principal
residences or investment properties) rose from $6.2 billion to $13.2 billion. Zhu Xiao et al.,
Second Homes: What, How Many, Where and Who, at 2 (Joint Center for Housing Studies,
Harvard University, N01-2, 2001).
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grew from 147 to 461 acres, as the percentage of farmers declined from 38% to
2.6% of the national labor force.27
Finally, property rights have also become “supersized” in terms of
political influence. Numerous advocacy groups oppose government regulation
that restricts the use of private property.28 Following the blueprint of Richard
Epstein, advocates argue,
[The] regulatory bureaucracy has become so large, unaccountable,
and powerful that Congress effectively has forfeited meaningful
oversight. . . . This leaves victimized private citizens, especially
smaller landowners and business persons, with the nearinsurmountable burden of challenging the government’s intrusive
land-use control in the courts.29
Accordingly, Epsteinian reformers promote an agenda expanding the force of
property rights, thereby invalidating many modern health, safety, and
environmental regulations.30

27

U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Agriculture in the Classroom, Growing a Nation: The Story of American
Agriculture (timeline), available at http://www.agclassroom.org/gan/timeline/farmers_land.htm
(visited Dec. 30, 2005).
28

Critics have dubbed as the “Takings Project” the aggressive use of the regulatory takings
doctrine to oppose property regulation. See Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings
Project: A Critical Analysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
509, 511 (1998) (identifying as “blueprint” for takings doctrine RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS,
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985)). Kendall and Lord argue that
the Project has been supported by an annual budget of approximately $15 million, supplied by
pro-development foundations, associations, attorneys, and individuals. See id. at 539-45. Kendall
and Lord assert that the Project’s budget is dedicated, in part, to the staging of meetings,
workshops, and all-expense paid seminars for judges. See id. at 546-50. See also Ann Southworth,
Conservative Lawyers and the Contest over the Meaning of “Public Interest Law,” 52 UCLA L.
REV. 1223 (2005).
29

M. David Stirling, Move Over Saddam: Overzealous Regulators Also Threaten Freedom, Feb.
25,
2003,
available
at
http://www.pacificlegal.org/view_SearchDetail.asp?tid=Commentary&sField=CommentaryID&iI
D=77 (visited Feb. 11, 2006).
30

Kendall & Lord, supra note 28.
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B.

Sanctifying Property Owners
Our God-given property rights are being stolen from us little by little.
The Constitution Party of Oregon31

The property rights movement has derived much of its force from a careful
choice of rhetoric. Despite the modern “supersizing” of property rights and
landowners, advocates strategically employ language that evokes the sympathetic
image of small landowners as a vulnerable “David” struggling against an
oppressive governmental “Goliath.” At least two rhetorical techniques have been
employed in an attempt to advance the position of property owners who desire to
be free from government regulation.
First, property advocates sanctify landowners by linking the goal of
unfettered land use to noble causes of the past. The Defenders of Property Rights,
for example, compares its mission to that of the civil rights movement: “Just as
segregation led to the civil rights movement in the 1960s, government intrusion
on property rights—largely in the name of protecting the environment—has
sparked a new crusade to protect an individual’s right to use and own all forms of
and interests in private property.”32 Similarly, the Washington Legal Foundation’s
chief legal counsel explains, “I look upon us as the bearers of the torch of the civil
rights movement. . . . I see us as successors to Martin Luther King and Thurgood
Marshall.”33 Other advocates search for an even higher moral ground, describing
the protection of property rights in religious terms. The Constitution Party of
Oregon, for example, sought to recall a state judge who had held unconstitutional
a voter-approved property rights initiative, complaining that “[o]ur God-given
property rights are being stolen from us little by little, and unless we take action
now, there will remain little left to us but the priveledge [sic] of paying property
taxes.”34

31

See The Constitution Part of Oregon, Petition Drive for Recall, Judge James PAC, Nov. 9,
2005, available at http://www.constitutionpartyoregon.net (visited Dec. 9, 2005) (criticizing
MacPherson v. Dep’t of Admin. Serv., No. 05C10444 (Or. Cir. Ct. Marion County 2005)).

32

Nancie G. Marzulla, The Property Rights Movement: How It Began and Where It Is Headed, in
LAND RIGHTS: THE 1990s PROPERTY RIGHTS REBELLION 24 (Bruce Yandle ed., 1995), cited by
Kendall & Lord, supra note 28, at n.133. Marzulla is the founder and president of Defenders of
Property Rights, an organization which describes itself as “the only national public-interest legal
foundation dedicated exclusively to the protection of constitutionally guaranteed rights.” See
http://www.yourpropertyrights.org.
33

Richard Perez-Pena, A Rights Movement that Emerges from the Right, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30,
1994 (quoting Richard Samp, chief legal counsel of the Washington Legal Foundation), cited in
Kendall & Lord, supra note 28, at n.135.
34

See supra note.
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As a second method of sanctifying landowners, advocates employ a
victimization technique, choosing particularly sympathetic landowners as clients
and portraying them as martyrs for their cause. For example, the Pacific Legal
Foundation (“PLF”)35 took up the appeal of an ailing widow in Suitum v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency.36 In its press release describing Suitum’s challenge
before the Supreme Court to land use regulations promulgated by the Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, the PLF referred to its client as “a wheelchair-bound
old widow who is rapidly losing her sight.”37 To explain its client’s twelve year
delay in seeking a building permit, the PLF argued: “In 1972, John and Bernadine
Suitum bought an 18,300 square foot lot in a residential subdivision in Incline
Village, not far from Lake Tahoe. The only reason why hers is the last lot that has
not yet been developed is because Mrs. Suitum’s late husband spent the last years
of his life battling illness.”38
Similarly, in United States v. Rapanos,39 the PLF represented a Michigan
commercial developer who drained and filled wetlands without applying for the
requisite federal permit under the Clean Water Act, proceeding in defiance of
several federal cease and desist orders.40 The PLF portrayed its client
sympathetically, describing him as “a 70-year-old Michigan grandfather who for
nearly two decades has fought overzealous government prosecutors seeking
prison time and more than $10 million in fees and fines because he failed to get a
federal permit before moving soil on his own property.”41
35

The Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) is a pro-development, non-profit legal foundation that has
been a "leading force" in the litigation campaign for private property rights. Kendall & Lord,
supra note 28, at 539-40. PLF terms itself a "representative in the courts for Americans who have
grown weary of overregulation by big government, over-indulgence by the courts, and excessive
interference in the American way of life." Pacific Legal Foundation, About Us,
http://pacificlegal.org/PLFProfile.asp (visited Jan. 27, 2006).
36

Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 US. 725 (1997). The Agency’s land use
planning process was challenged more recently in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (rejecting claim that moratoria prohibiting
virtually all development for a 32-month period constituted a categorical taking).
37

James S. Burling, Widow Suitum Fights a “Strange Doctrine” (press release by PLF’s Director
of Property Rights), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/practicegroupnewsletters/
(visited Jan. 27, 2006).

38

Id.

39

Rapanos v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 2208 (2006).

40

Id.

41

Pacific Legal Foundation, Supreme Court to Hear Landmark Wetlands Case: PLF Asks High
Court to Set Wetlands Law Straight, Oct. 11, 2005. The Sixth Circuit described Rapanos in less
sympathetic terms. In observing that Rapanos had been displeased by the report of his own
consultant, Dr. Goff, which found 48-58 acres of protected wetlands on one of Rapanos’
commercial properties, the court noted:

10

The victimization technique has not been confined to individual
landowners, but has been applied as well to large corporations. In attempting to
portray Wal-Mart as the victim of city planning, the PLF asserted in a press
release that “city officials’ relentless attacks on Wal-Mart [represent] paternalistic
poli[cies] that [do] nothing but deny entry-level employment opportunities to
those who need them the most; an attempt to keep out basic goods at affordable
prices; and an assault on the right of Wal-Mart to do business.”42 The Foundation
concludes, “Free markets and freedom of choice: These American values are the
true victims of this war on the Wal-Marts of this world. Consumers must . . . tell
their city representatives to stop discriminating against businesses, large and
small. It’s the American thing to do.”43
C.

Demonizing the Public Interest
[W]etlands regulations, like the Endangered Species Act, have been used to rob
citizens of the use of millions of acres of private land.
How “Wetlands” Threaten Freedom (2006)44
Upset by the report, Mr. Rapanos ordered Dr. Goff to destroy both the report
and map, as well as all references to Mr. Rapanos in Dr. Goff's files. However,
Dr. Goff was unwilling to do so. Mr. Rapanos stated he would “destroy” Dr.
Goff if he did not comply, claiming that he would do away with the report and
bulldoze the site himself, regardless of Dr. Goff's findings.”

United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 632 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded sub. nom
Rapanos v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 2208 (2006).
See also J. David Breemer, The Wisdom of Growth: What Can California Learn from a Recent
Property Rights Proposition in Oregon—the State Long Viewed as an Anti-Sprawl Mecca?,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 12, 2004 (PLF staff attorney criticizes local forest ordinance,
complaining “[a]ll that Thomas and Doris Dodd wanted to do was build a retirement home on 40
acres of land they purchased in 1983. . . . But the county wanted the land as a forest preserve, so it
passed an ordinance banning construction on the Dodd’s property, destroying their American
dream”). See also Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219, 1230. (6th Cir. 1998) (denying
Dodds’ claim that application of zoning ordinance worked a regulatory taking, in part because
landowners’ six-year delay in subject construction project defeated their claim to reasonable,
investment-backed expectations).
42

Paul J. Beard II, An Assault on Freedom (press release by PLF staff attorney), available at
http://www.pacificlegal.org/view_SearchDetail.asp?tid=Commentary&sField=CommentaryID&iI
D=140 (visited Feb. 11, 2006)..
43

Id.

44

Jane Chastain, How “Wetlands” Threaten Freedom, WORLDNETDAILY, June 29, 2006,
available at http://worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=50830 (last visited Nov. 4,
2006) (describing petitioners in Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006) as “modern-day
freedom fighters [who fought the federal government for the right to develop land they owned in
the state of Michigan]”).
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As a corollary to the sanctification of landowners, property advocates try
to diminish the importance of the public interest. Drawing support from those
who criticize “big government,” advocates conflate environmental regulation with
the size of government. Such rhetoric taps into the privatization movement that
seeks to replace numerous government programs with private sector operations.
In recent times, the call for privatization has influenced such stalwart government
programs as welfare, medicare, and social security. Even the conduct of war has
been privatized.45 Supporters of both privatization and strong individual property
rights distrust—and at times, even scorn—government regulation conducted in
the name of the public interest.
At least two techniques promote the demonization of the public interest.
First, property advocates portray the government as a bully. In Rapanos, for
example, the Pacific Legal Foundation asserted, “Mr. Rapanos’ case is about
federal power, not protecting wetlands. Federal officials have been exploiting the
Clean Water Act to bully and take land and money from property owners for far
too long. . . .”46 Likewise, property groups have variously criticized land use
regulations as “[the embodiment of the] selfish demands of established
neighborhood groups or single issue environmental constituencies”47 and as
“nothing more than an attempt to control at the federal level how and where
people live, work, and travel by depriving homeowners and small businesses of
choice.”48 Moreover, Wal-Mart has cast local zoning regulations affecting its
stores as tantamount to Nazi book-burnings in the 1930s.49
45

See Greg Guma, Privatizing War, COMMON DREAMS NEWS CENTER, July 7, 2004 (progressive
critique of privatization, alleging that “[d]uring the first Gulf War, about two percent of U.S.
military personnel were private workers. As of 2003, it had reached 10 percent. The Pentagon
employs more than 700,000 private contractors, and at least $33 billion of the $416 billion in
military spending overwhelmingly approved by the Senate [in June 2004] will go to [private
military
corporations]”),
available
at
http://www.commondreams.org/cgibin/print.cgi?file=/views04/0707-14.htm (visited Jan. 22, 2006). See also Clifford J. Rosky, Force,
Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L.
REV. 879 (2004).
46

Pacific Legal Foundation, supra note 41 (quoting Reed Hopper, principal PLF attorney).

47

Brief of the National Association of Home Builders and the International Council of Shopping
Centers as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner [hereinafter, NAHB, Lucas Brief] at *6, Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (No. 91-453), available at 1991 WL
11004084.
48

Defenders of Property Rights, Property Rights and “Smart Growth” Policies, available at
http://www.yourpropertyrights.org/index.asp. (criticizing “smart growth” regulations as “stifling
property rights, economic development, and civil rights” and “den[ying] the dream of home
ownership”).
49

In response to a ballot referendum in Flagstaff, Arizona opposing the construction of a new
Wal-Mart store, the company placed an ad in the Arizona Daily Sun—featuring a photo of a 1933
Nazi book burning in Berlin—with the caption, “Should we let government tell us what we can
read? . . . So why should we allow local government to limit where we shop? Or how much of a
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As a second method of demonizing the public interest, property advocates
employ a “no harm” technique, denying that the actions of individual landowners
have adverse consequences upon the community and its natural environment. In
Suitum, for example, the Pacific Legal Foundation complained that government
regulators “never presented any evidence that there would be any environmental
harm [to the Lake Tahoe Basin] if Mrs. Suitum is allowed to build the properly
constructed modest retirement home of her dreams.”50 Similarly, in Lucas, the
National Association of Home Builders (“NAHB”) submitted an amicus brief in
support of landowner/developer Lucas, denying that the development of certain
coastal land would cause any harm.51 The NAHB argued “As the united voice of
the home building industry in America, the NAHB cannot let pass the central idea
in the legislation before this Court, i.e., that there is something so nefarious about
the building of a home that home construction can be condemned as a nuisance.52
Although petitioner Lucas developed expensive homes in one of the nation’s
wealthiest communities, the NAHB portrayed his actions as both harmless and
noble: “In an economic era when people find themselves compelled to seek large
packing crates for shelter, there seems something oddly surreal in condemning the
construction of homes as a nuisance which is so heinous that it can be prevented
without any thought of compensating the landowner.”53

store’s floor space can be used to sell groceries? . . . Choice is a freedom worth keeping.” See
Wal-Mart Watch, Shameless: How Wal-Mart Bullies its Way into Communities Across America,
available at http://walmartwatch.com (reproducing Wal-Mart advertisement in Arizona Daily Sun,
May 5, 2005).
50

Burling, Widow Suitum, supra note 37. Compare Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 307-08 (2002) (recounting how “the lake’s
unsurpassed beauty . . . is the wellspring of its undoing” and noting that the “upsurge of
development in the area [] caused ‘increased nutrient loading of the lake largely because of the
impervious coverage of land in the Basin resulting from that development’”).
51

NAHB, Lucas Brief, supra note 47. The parties to the litigation had stipulated to the contrary. In
particular, for purposes of the litigation, petitioner Lucas stipulated that the subject “beach/dune
area of South Carolina’s shores is an extremely valuable public resource; that the erection of new
construction contributes to the erosion and destruction of this public resource; and that
discouraging new construction in close proximity to the beach/dune area is necessary to prevent a
great public harm.” Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. at 1003, 1022 (1992)
(quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 898 (S.C. 1991)).

52

NAHB, Lucas Brief, supra at *4.

53

Id.
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II. LUCAS V. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL: THROUGH THE EYE OF THE
HURRICANE
A.

The Lucas Rule: Environmental Cynicism
[R]egulations that leave the owner of land without economically beneficial or
productive options for its use—typically, as here, by requiring land to be left
substantially in its natural state—carry with them a heightened risk that private
property is being pressed into some form of public service under the guise of
mitigating serious public harm.54

Lucas represents one of the modern Court’s most important applications of
the regulatory takings doctrine. It also illustrates what this article calls
environmental cynicism, the Court’s inability to appreciate the value of
undisturbed nature, and the Court’s doubt that the destruction of natural
landscapes through development causes measurable harm to neighboring
communities. 55
The facts of Lucas are straightforward: The plaintiff/petitioner, David
Lucas, claimed that a South Carolina statute limiting development of his
beachfront property on the Isle of Palms worked a regulatory taking for which the
state owed compensation.56 For purposes of the litigation, Lucas conceded that
“discouraging new construction in close proximity to the beach/dune area is
necessary to prevent a great public harm.”57 However, Lucas convinced the lower
court that the challenged development restrictions had rendered his lots
“valueless,” a finding the Supreme Court did not disturb.58 Under traditional
regulatory takings analysis—as outlined in Penn Central Transportation Company
v. City of New York—the severe economic impact to Lucas’s property caused by
South Carolina’s regulation might be offset by the critical governmental safety
objective.59 As the Penn Central Court had suggested in 1978, “a ‘taking’ may
54

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018 (emphasis supplied).

55

See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental About Environmental Law in
the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L.R. 703 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court has failed to
appreciate environmental law as a distinct area of law during the past three decades).
56

The relevant statute was the South Carolina Beachfront Management Act. See S.C. Code Ann. §
48-39-290(A). As applied to the Lucas property, the statute “had the direct effect of barring
petitioner from erecting any permanent habitable structures on his two parcels.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1007.

57

Id. at 1020.

58

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006.

59

Penn Central Transp. Company v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (identifying
several analytical factors of “particular significance,” including “the economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant,” “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations,” and “the character of the government action”).
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more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as
a physical invasion by government . . . than when interference arises from some
public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good.”60 In holding for the petitioner, the Lucas Court declined to apply
the traditional Penn Central analysis. Instead, the Court created a new total
takings categorical rule, requiring governments to compensate landowners
whenever regulation “deprives land of all economically beneficial use.”61
The Isle of Palms was no ordinary community, rendering Lucas a tale of
supersized property rights. In 2000, the area boasted a median household income
81% above the national average.62 For his part, David Lucas was no ordinary
landowner. In 1984, Lucas headed up a development partnership that purchased
the Wild Dunes Beach and Racquet Club on the Isle of Palms for twenty-five
million dollars.63 The partnership, Wild Dunes Associates, developed an exclusive
1500-acre gated community that included 2500 residences and vacation homes,
two golf courses, and a large marina.64 The project made Lucas a wealthy man,
generating $100 million in sales by its second year.65 In 1986, Lucas sold off his
interest in the partnership. Just months later, he re-purchased for himself two of
the last undeveloped beachfront lots for the sum of $975,000. The fate of these
two lots—severed from some 2500 other lots in the resort—would become the
limited focus of the Supreme Court litigation.66
60

Id.

61

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026-27.

62

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2000 CENSUS, available at http://www.epodunk.com/cgibin/genInfo.php?locIndex=13199 (reporting the local median household income on the Isle of
Palms as $76,170 and the national median household income as $41,994).

63

VICKI BEEN, LUCAS V. THE GREEN MACHINE: USING THE TAKINGS CLAUSE TO PROMOTE MORE
EFFICIENT REGULATION? (2004).
64

The golf courses were ranked among the best in the world, and the marina was one of the largest
facilities in the southeastern United States. Been, supra, at n.22 .
65

Id. at n. 23 .

66

Some have speculated that the bifurcation of the sale and purchase transactions was a strategic
decision to frame Lucas’s position in more sympathetic terms, should litigation erupt:
Although it is hard to understand why Lucas would have acquired the lots at the
high end of fair market value after he had cashed in . . . , it’s much easier to
understand why he might want to describe his acquisition that way if attention
were ever focused on the transaction. . . . [I]f one were trying to “position” the
transaction for purposes of a subsequent takings lawsuit, it undoubtedly would
be preferable to be seen as a “little guy” with just two lots whose value was
destroyed than to be cast as a wealthy developer of more than 2500 homes,
prevented from building on just two lots.
Id. at n. 34 .
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The Court’s environmental cynicism led it to create a new categorical rule
of governmental liability, rejecting the state’s argument that it had acted to
mitigate serious public harm when it refused to approve Lucas’ building plans.
For example, South Carolina presented evidence that undeveloped lands provide
valuable protection against coastal storms and hurricanes, and that for “roughly
half of the last 40 years, all or part of [the Lucas] property was part of the beach
or flooded twice daily.”67 In addition, petitioner Lucas conceded the validity of
the statutory purpose, accepting legislative findings that an undisturbed
beach/dune zone “protects life and property by serving as a storm barrier which
dissipates wave energy and contributes to shoreline stability in an economical and
effective manner.”68 Despite such evidence, the Court accepted the premise that
oceanfront lands are “valueless” in their natural state.69 The majority dismissed as
meaningless legislative findings that coastal development must be regulated to
prevent harm to the community, concluding that “[because] such a justification
can be formulated in practically every case, this amounts to a test of whether the
legislature has a stupid staff.”70
As it announced its new rule, the Court also sowed the seeds of its
destruction. The Court predicted that the rule would apply in only “extraordinary”
or “relatively rare” circumstances.71 The concurring and dissenting justices went
67

Justice Blackmun noted in dissent,
The area is notoriously unstable. . . . Between 1957 and 1963, petitioner’s
property was under water. Between 1963 and 1973, the shoreline was 100 to 150
feet onto petitioner’s property. In 1973, the first line of stable vegetation was
about halfway through the property. Between 1981 and 1983, the Isle of Palms
issued 12 emergency orders for sandbagging to protect property in the Wild
Dunes development [and a state agency determined that habitable structures
were in imminent danger of collapse].

505 U.S. at 1038-39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
68

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1021.

69

See supra note. The majority stated, “[w]hether Lucas’s construction of single-family residences
on his parcels should be described as bringing ‘harm’ to South Carolina’s adjacent ecological
resources thus depends principally upon whether the describer believes that the State’s use interest
in nurturing those resources is so important that any competing adjacent use must yield.” Lucas,
505 U.S. at 1025. But see Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1065 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (complaining that “the
Court offers no basis for its assumption that the only uses of property cognizable under the
Constitution are developmental uses”).

70

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1025 n.12. See also id. at 1010 (suggesting that main legislative goals were
to promote tourism and to create natural habitat, rather than to prevent development amounting to
a public nuisance).
71

Id. at 1016, 1018. Ten years later, the Court clarified that the Lucas rule applies to permanent
regulatory takings only: "Lucas carved out a narrow exception to the rules governing regulatory
takings for the 'extraordinary circumstance' of a permanent deprivation of all beneficial use."
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further, doubting even that the new rule applied to the case at bar—describing the
lower court’s finding that the development regulation had rendered Lucas’s lots
valueless as “curious”72 and “almost certainly erroneous.”73 Moreover, the Court
was quick to establish a defense to its new rule. As Justice Stevens noted wryly in
dissent, “Like many bright line rules, the categorical rule established in this case
is only ‘categorical’ for a page or two in the U.S. Reports. No sooner does the
Court state that ‘total regulatory takings must be compensated’ than it quickly
establishes an exception to that rule.”74
B.

The Lucas Defense: New Nuisance as Evolutionary, Antecedent Inquiry

The Court tempered its new categorical rule with a governmental defense
of apparently limited scope. Relying heavily upon judges, rather than legislators,
to establish the proper balance between private rights and the public interest, the
Court set forth the new nuisance defense that is the focus of this article:
[Regulations that deprive property of all economically beneficial
use] cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without
compensation), but must inhere in . . . the restrictions that
background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance
already place upon land ownership. A law or decree with such an
effect must, in other words, do no more than duplicate the result
that could have been achieved in the courts—by adjacent
landowners . . . under the State’s law of private nuisance, or by the
State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect
the public generally, or otherwise.”75
In traditional nuisance terms the Court explained that “the owner of a lake-bed . . .
for example, would not be entitled to compensation when he is denied the
requisite permit to engage in a landfilling operation that would have the effect of
flooding others’ land.”76 In dissent, Justice Blackmun chastised the Court for its
elevation of longstanding judicial judgments above legislative judgments, arguing

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Authority, 535 U.S. 302, 542
n.19 (2002).
72

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

73

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1043-44 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

74

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

75

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.

76

Id. at 1029.
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“[t]here is nothing magical in the reasoning of judges long dead. They determined
a harm in the same way as state judges and legislators do today.”77
The Court added two brief qualifications to its new defense that would
prove to be surprisingly beneficial to future government defendants.78 First, the
Court explained that to resist compensation, the state must demonstrate that “the
logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the
proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with.”79 This reference
to an “antecedent inquiry” would develop into an important affirmative defense
for government litigants.80 Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence provided an
important reminder that nuisance law is fundamentally evolutionary, such that
“changed circumstances or new knowledge may make what was previously
permissible no longer so.”81 As a result, “the State should not be prevented from
enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to changing conditions.”82
C.

The Lucas Bookends: From Hurricane Hugo to Hurricane Katrina

By viewing Lucas through the lens of the region’s recurrent experience
with hurricanes, this section brings the Court’s environmental cynicism into sharp
focus. From Hurricane Hugo (1989) to Hurricane Katrina (2005) and beyond, the
southeastern United States has been pummeled repeatedly by coastal storms and
hurricanes. The site of Lucas—the Isle of Palms, South Carolina—was
particularly vulnerable. As a barrier island, the area was “notoriously unstable.”83
As defined by one South Carolina state agency, barrier islands are “tidewater
landforms that protect the mainland from the effects of sea storms, [and] are
characterized by an ever-changing beach, sand dunes, maritime forest and salt
marsh.”84

77

Id. at 1054 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

78

See Michael C. Blumm, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as
Categorical Takings Defense, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 322 (2005).

79

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (emphasis added).

80

See infra notes and accompanying text.

81

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

82

Id. at 1035.

83

See supra note.

84

South Carolina Dep’t of Parks, Recreation & Tourism, Discover Carolina: Life and Death of a
Barrier
Island—Vocabulary
List,
available
at
http://www.discovercarolina.com/html/s05nature104a01e.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2007).
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Prior to the 1992 decision in Lucas, South Carolina had a long history as a
target of deadly storms, including significant activity in 1893, 1916, 1940, 1954
(“Hurricane Hazel”), 1959 (“Hurricane Gracie”), and 1989 (“Hurricane Hugo”).85
Just three years prior to the Court’s decision in Lucas, Hurricane Hugo had struck
the very island in dispute—the Isle of Palms—leading to thirty-five fatalities and
six billion dollars in damage.86 Despite the seriousness of these storms, only the
dissenting Justices in Lucas would have upheld the application of South
Carolina’s protective legislation. Drawing from “the hard lessons of
experience,”87 Justice Stevens found that the state’s argument that the
“beach/dune system [acts] as a buffer from high tides, storm surge, [and]
hurricanes” had “much science on its side.”88 Likewise, dissenting Justice
Blackmun argued that “uncontrolled beachfront development can cause serious
damage to life and property” by “destroy[ing] the natural sand dune barriers that
provide storm breaks.”89 He worried that “beachfront buildings are not only
themselves destroyed [by hurricanes], ‘but they are often driven, like battering
rams, into adjacent inland homes.’”90
After Lucas, the storm pattern continued, both in South Carolina and in the
broader southeastern region of the United States. Less than one month after the
Court decided Lucas, Hurricane Andrew made landfall along the Gulf Coast of
Louisiana and Florida, leading to forty deaths and thirty billion dollars in property
damage.91 Subsequent years witnessed additional deadly storms. In 2004, nine
tropical storms caused over forty-two billion dollars in damage, more than one
hundred deaths along the Atlantic coast of the United States, and some three

85

SOUTH CAROLINA CLIMATE OFFICE PUBLICATIONS, HURRICANES, South Carolina Hurricane
Facts, available at http://www.dnr.sc.gov/climate/schurr_pub.html (visited Mar. 6, 2006).

86

Id.

87

Respondent’s Brief on Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina, at
*31, available at 1992 WL 672613 (1992) (arguing that legislative policies regulating coastal
development “are not based upon abstract conclusions that building on barrier islands like the Isle
of Palms is dangerous to life and property and significantly damaging to the fragile beach/dune
system”).
88

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1075 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

89

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1037 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (drawing lessons from 29 deaths and $6
billion in property damage caused by Hurricane Hugo in 1989).

90

Id.

91

After the Storm: Hurricane Andrew Ten Years Later, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, available at
http://www.sptimes/2002/webspecials02/andrew/ (describing hurricane’s path across south Florida
and Louisiana).
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thousand deaths in Haiti.92 The 2005 storm season would be even more severe for
the United States, when Hurricanes Katrina and Rita struck the Gulf coast on
August 29 and September 24, respectively. Causing a storm surge of twenty-nine
feet, Katrina flooded approximately eighty percent of the city of New Orleans, all
of St. Bernard Parish, and sections of two other parishes.93 The storm resulted in
the death of 1,420 people and caused $75 billion dollars in damage.94 Hurricane
Rita, the fourth most intense Atlantic hurricane ever recorded, caused some ten
billion dollars in damage.95
Although analysis is ongoing, several lessons have emerged from these
disasters.96 First, wetlands are valuable resources that moderate the impacts of
coastal storms and hurricanes. The General Accounting Office likens wetlands to
“speed bump[s], slowing down storms almost as dry land does.”97 Although not
free from dispute, there is evidence that that every 2.7 linear miles of coastal
wetlands can reduce the height of storm surges by one foot.98 Second, “natural”
disasters such as hurricanes can be exacerbated by human activity. For example,
Louisiana and other Gulf States were rendered increasingly vulnerable to
hurricanes as coastal wetlands were destroyed. The Congressional Research
Service reports that “[i]t is now believed that more than 1.2 million acres [of Gulf

92

National Climatic Data Center, Climate of 2004: Atlantic Hurricane Season, Dec. 13, 2004,
available at http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/2004/hurricanes04.html (visited Mar.
6, 2006).
93

Wikipedia, Hurricane Katrina, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurricane Katrina
(visited Mar. 6, 2006).
94

Id.

95

Wikipedia, Hurricane Rita, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurricane_Rita (visited
Aug. 23, 2006).

96

For a compilation of information about Louisiana’s coastal wetlands derived from experts in the
field
and
sponsored
by
the
“America’s
Wetland”
campaign,
see
http://www.americaswetlandresources.com/.
97

GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Providing Oversight of the Nation’s Preparedness, Response, and
Recovery Activities, at *7, Sept. 28, 2005 (GAO-05-1053T Hurricane Katrina) (noting that
wetlands, “once regarded as unimportant areas to be filled or drained . . . are now recognized for
[a] variety of important functions . . . including providing flood control by slowing down and
absorbing excess water during storms . . . and protecting coastal and upland areas from erosion”).

98

Bob Sullivan, Wetlands Erosion Raises Hurricane Risks, MSNBS, Aug. 29, 2005 (quoting
Sidney Coffee, executive assistant to the governor for coastal activities); Louisiana Sea Grant,
Louisiana
Hurricane
Recovery
Resources,
available
at
http://www.laseagrant.org/hurricane/wetlands.htm (quoting Rex Caffey, Louisiana Sea Grant
College Program, Louisiana State University Ag Center for the proposition that “[a]t a minimum,
we can say that the net loss of 1.2 million acres of coastal wetlands has definitely increased the
vulnerability and exposure of Louisiana’s critical coastal infrastructure”).
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Coast] wetlands, an area approximately the size of Delaware, has been converted
to open water since the 1930s.”99
In light of these “changed circumstances” and “new knowledge,” would
the Court decide Lucas differently today?100 Some evidence suggests a negative
response, indicating that the Supreme Court remains skeptical that wetlands
function as natural flood control systems, at least in the context of non-coastal,
interior wetlands.101 Despite the Supreme Court’s continued environmental
cynicism, state courts and the lower federal courts appear more willing to
incorporate new learning into their background principles of property law and
nuisance.102
III. PROPERTY RIGHTS REFORM: LUCAS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
And so, my fellow Americans: ask not what your country can do for you—ask
what you can do for your country.
President John F. Kennedy (1961)103
[W]e must be clear about our purposes. The aim here is efficiency, not austerity.
. . . Conservation may be a sign of personal virtue, but it is not a sufficient basis
all by itself for sound, comprehensive energy policy.
Vice President Dick Cheney (2001)104

99

Jeffrey Zinn, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and the Coastal Louisiana Ecosystem Restoration, at
*2, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE (RS22276), Sept. 26, 2005.

100

In a different environmental context, the Court has changed course in light of new learning
about the danger of certain methods of coal extraction. Compare Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922) (holding Kohler Act worked a regulatory taking, despite asserted public
safety purpose of preventing mine-induced subsidence) and Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (holding state mining regulation does not work a regulatory
taking, despite its striking similarity to the Kohler Act). See also See also M&J Coal Co. v. United
States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that subsidence control plan was not a taking
under Lucas nuisance defense); Department of Environmental Protection (Pennsylvania), A
Homeowner’s
Guide
to
Mine
Subsidence,
available
at
http://www.dep.state.pa.us/MSIHomeowners/ (visited Mar. 6, 2006).
101

See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S.Ct. 2208 (2006).

102

See infra Part IV.
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John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address, Jan. 20, 1961.
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Vice President Dick Cheney, Apr. 30, 2001 (remarks at the annual meeting of the Associated
Press, Toronto, Ontario), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/newsspeeches/speeches/print/vp20010430.html (visited Feb. 5, 2006).

21

Society has long struggled to achieve a balance between individual
autonomy and the welfare of the community. From the perspective of the
individual, this represents a search for balance between rights and responsibilities,
and between personal freedom and sacrifice for the commonwealth. From the
perspective of political theory, this represents a tension between the visions of
government as laissez-faire-protector-of-vested-rights, and government as publicinterest-regulator. As discussed in Part I, property advocates have undertaken a
highly-organized campaign over the past few decades to win public support for
stronger individual rights, fewer individual responsibilities, and weaker
governmental regulation.
This section places the autonomy/community, rights/responsibilities
tension into historical context, noting cycles during which one or the other of the
competing philosophies has claimed a position of ascendancy. As a broad
generalization, the discussion identifies the following dominant paradigms of the
twentieth century: individualism (1900-1933); communitarianism (1933-81); and
individualism (1981-2000). This section concludes by observing signs of a return
to the spirit of community responsibility, coinciding roughly with the end of both
the twentieth century and the Rehnquist Court.105
A.

The Industrial Revolution: Promoting Individual Rights

The rise of the modern industrialized world has dramatically changed the
quality of life, in both positive and negative ways. The first wave of the industrial
revolution occurred in Great Britain at the end of the 18th century. By the end of
the 19th century, a “second” industrial revolution was occurring in the United
States.106 Overall, the industrialization of the United States spawned a rational,
but perhaps over-exuberant embrace of economic and industrial growth, often at
the expense of other social values. “Property rights” were of paramount value
during this time, even if the rights holder was a vast industry or corporation,
rather than an identifiable human being. Popular culture reinforced this preference
for autonomy and rights over community and responsibility. For example, the
“flapper” society of the 1920s drew support from “the popular contempt for
prohibition” and from a “widespread disdain for authority.”107
Many judges of the early twentieth century embraced the new economic
and social order with unquestioning faith in the virtue of “progress,” zealously
105

See infra Part III.D. William H. Rehnquist was Chief Justice from September 26, 1986 to
September 3, 2005. Supreme Court of the United States, Members of the Supreme Court of the
United States, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov (visited Aug. 2, 2006).
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See
MSN
Encarta,
Industrial
Revolution,
available
at
http://Encarta.msn.com/text_761577952__0/Industrial_Revolution.html (visited Jan. 22, 2006).
107

See
Wikipedia,
Flapper (entry in
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ (visited July 30, 2006).
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encyclopedia),

available

at

protecting individual property and autonomy through substantive due process
analysis. As illustrated by the now-discredited decision in Lochner v. New
York,108 the Supreme Court then looked with distrust upon public interest
legislation designed to protect the health, safety, and welfare of laborers by
limiting the rights of industrial employers.109
The case of the developing railroads presents another example of judicial
solicitude for the maintenance of an industry relatively unfettered by
governmental regulation. In articulating the well-known “stop, look, and listen”
rule for railroad crossings, Justice Holmes’ 1927 observation serves as a metaphor
for the march of progress: “When a man goes upon a railroad track he knows that
he goes to a place where he will be killed if a train comes upon him before he is
clear of the track. He knows that he must stop for the train not the train stop for
him.”110
B.

The New Deal and the Great Society: Promoting Community Welfare
The Government cannot get along without you [community leaders]. The
Federal, State, local Governments can’t. The whole period we are going through
will come back in the end to individual citizens, to individual responsibility, to
private organization, through the years to come.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933)111
[The Great Society] is a place where the city of man serves not only the needs of
the body and the demands of commerce but the desire for beauty and the hunger
for community.
President Lyndon B. Johnson (1964)

112
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Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (reversing conviction of bakery owner for violating
labor safety law setting maximum hours for New York bakers), overruled in part by Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
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The Court indicated little interest in upholding laws “pertaining to the health of the individual
engaged in the occupation of a baker,” particularly where such laws might hinder economic
productivity. Lochner, supra at 57 (concluding that“[clean] and wholesome bread does not depend
upon whether the baker works but ten hours per day or only sixty hours a week”). But see id. at 70
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (claiming that bakery work was then notoriously difficult, involving “a
great deal of physical exertion in an overheated workshop,” the “constant inhaling of flour dust,”
and a reduced life span).
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Baltimore & O. Railroad Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 69-70 (1927) (Holmes, J.) (reversing
judgment for estate of deceased automobile driver and establishing the rule that travelers must
“stop, look, and listen” before crossing the tracks).
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available
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As industrialization became more widespread, so also did its abuses. As a
reaction to the excesses of the first wave of industrialization, the common law of
negligence and nuisance evolved as remedies for torts, both direct and indirect.113
By the end of the nineteenth century, the great leaders of industry—heading
powerful railroad, steel, oil, and tobacco corporations—would be simultaneously
revered as “captains of industry” and scorned as “robber barons.”114 As an
antidote to the latter, beginning with the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, Congress
began to pass legislation to protect the public from anticompetitive behavior.115
After the stock market crash of 1929, Congress turned its legislative
attention to the restoration of the nation’s economic and social wellbeing. During
the so-called New Deal era of the 1930s during the presidency of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, Congress passed a host of new public interest legislation, including the
Social Security Act of 1935116 and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.117
President Roosevelt’s social legislation continued during the 1960s, as
President Lyndon B. Johnson’s “Great Society” program sought to bring an end to
poverty and racial injustice.118 Johnson’s initiative led to the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,119 the Voting Rights Bill of 1965,120 and the creation of
112
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2006).
113
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Medicare,121 Medicaid,122 Head Start,123 the Job Corps,124 and the Community
Action Program.125 Overall, the period from roughly 1933-1981 witnessed the
formation of the modern welfare state. During this time, there was an increasing
appreciation for the role of the federal government as an agent to promote and
protect the public interest.
C.

From New Property to New Nuisance: The Return of Individual Rights

Two influential scholars of the twentieth century—Charles Reich and
Richard Epstein—used the language of individual “rights” in framing
impassioned pleas for social reform. Both feared the power of the majority to
impose its will upon lone individuals. But beyond the common call for increased
rights, their philosophies diverged. Following on the heels of the New Deal and
roughly contemporaneous with the Great Society era, Reich’s scholarship on the
“new property” emphasized the community’s responsibility to ensure that all its
members enjoyed at least the basic necessities of life.126 Epstein’s writings, in
contrast, mark an historical shift from the philosophy of communitarianism to that
of individualism.127 His work—which resonated with the Reagan era’s antipathy
toward governmental regulation128—formed the intellectual blueprint for the
modern property rights movement.129 Epstein’s views influenced the Supreme
Court, most notably in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,130where the
Court limited the permissible scope of uncompensated government regulation in
certain cases to a seemingly narrow “new nuisance” defense.131
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1. The New Property
As we move toward a welfare state, largess will be an ever more important form
of wealth. And largess is a vital link in the relationship between the government
and private sides of society. It is necessary, then, that largess begin to do the
work of property.
Charles Reich (1964) 132

During the contagious optimism and idealism of the Great Society era,
Charles Reich wrote The New Property.133 From his 1964 vantage point, Reich
attempted to describe the emerging “new society.”134 He focused particularly
upon government largesse—forms of wealth dispensed by the government to its
citizens, including income, benefits, jobs, occupational licenses, franchises,
contracts, subsidies, and services.135 Reich observed that these new government
benefits were “steadily taking the place of traditional forms of wealth—forms
which are held as private property.”136 But Reich worried that these new benefits
failed to incorporate sufficient safeguards for their recipients. Instead, he feared,
the government had broad discretion to withdraw these intangible rights at any
time.137 Reich accepted that the new “public interest state” was part of a “great
and necessary movement for reform.”138 He saw the “revised social contract” as a
government promise to protect its citizens from “the extremes of economic
dislocation.”139 And he acknowledged that there was no turning back.140 Overall,
132

Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 778 (1964). See also Charles A. Reich,
Property Law and the New Economic Order: A Betrayal of Middle Americans and the Poor
(hereinafter, The New Economic Order), 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 817 (1996) (asserting that “in a
centrally managed economy, such as we have today, the due process clause gives every person in
America a constitutional right to minimum subsistence and housing, to child care, education,
employment, health insurance, retirement, and to a clean and healthy natural environment”).
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Reich, The New Property, supra at 733.
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Id. at 734-37.
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Id. at 733.
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Id. at 738. Reich noted that “wealth that flows from the government is held by its recipients
conditionally, subject to confiscation in the interest of the paramount state,” a result that
“resembles the philosophy of feudal tenure.” Id. at 768-69.
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in their own interest.” Reich, The New Property, supra note 132, at 778.
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however, Reich asserted that the “public interest” had been grossly
misinterpreted, thereby distorting the high purposes of the reforms of the New
Deal and the New Society.141
To compensate for the insecurity of benefits provided by the emerging
welfare state, Reich proposed a solution cloaked in the language of rights and
property. He argued not for the abolition of government welfare programs, but
instead that individual entitlements under such programs should receive the
protections enjoyed by private property.142 In sum, he argued that the conception
of government benefits should move from largess to right. Reich more fully
developed his views in three subsequent articles: Beyond the New Property: An
Ecological View of Due Process (1990);143 The Liberty Impact of the New
Property (1990);144 and Property Law and the New Economic Order: A Betrayal
of Middle Americans and the Poor (1996).145
As an initial matter, there may appear to be an alignment of interests
between Reich and the modern-day property rights movement. From this
perspective, The New Property might be a precursor to the writings of Epstein and
other property rights advocates.146 At least three facets of Reich’s writing,
however, belie this preliminary impression. First, Reich tempered his concern for
private property with a firm underpinning of instrumentalism. He was—first and
foremost—a champion of society’s weakest and most vulnerable members,
deploring the inequalities that he observed throughout his life. Over twenty-five
years after the publication of The New Property, Reich asserted passionately:
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Id. at 777.
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In 1996, Reich summarized the thesis of The New Property this way:
As a result of reform efforts, “increased constitutional powers were assumed by
the government in return for societal responsibility to the individuals who gave
up their economic independence in recognition of the greater efficiency of large
organizations.” The New Property argued that, if the new social contract was to
be respected, welfare state protections and benefits for the middle class and the
poor must be treated as entitlements—a substitute for old forms of property.
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An Ecological View), 56 BROOK. L. REV. 731 (1990).
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WM. & MARY L. REV. at 295 (1990).
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It is one thing to accept inequality as part of our system, where
some enjoy luxury while other lives are comparatively spartan. But
what we see today is not the kind of inequality that provides
incentive to healthy ambition; it is misery that fills the rest of us
with fear and horror. This is too great a punishment for
fecklessness or failure; it falls below the line of what any society
can morally tolerate.147
A persistent critic of the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few,148 Reich
claimed, “ownership has allowed corporations to become empires, sometimes
under the control of a single individual.” Far from favoring the autonomous rights
advanced by Epstein, Reich concluded that as a result of economic disparity,
property law “has been turned upside down.” 149
As a second line of departure from modern property rights advocates,
Reich’s writings are communitarian rather than individualistic in tone,
emphasizing responsibility as well as rights. He identified as fundamental the
question of “how much responsibility . . . the community [should] take for the
protection of the individual.”150 In arguing for a broad duty, Reich exclaimed,
“there is something grotesquely wrong with a society that denies individual life
support while spending billions of dollars of public money on anything else. That
even one person should be without shelter while the community’s wealth is spent
elsewhere is an abomination.”151 In emphasizing responsibility as well as right, he
147

Reich, An Ecological View, supra note 143, at 743.
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Reich, The New Economic Order, supra note 132, at 823 (observing, “[a]s a result of the denial
of true ownership to individuals, corporations, along with a small group of very rich individuals,
have become the principal owners of the nation’s wealth”).
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Id. at 819. In The New Property, Reich observed that previous reforms,
took away some of the power of the corporations and transferred it to
government. In this transfer there was much good, for power was made
responsive to the majority rather than to the arbitrary and selfish few. But the
reform did not restore the individual to his domain. What the corporation had
taken from him, the reform simply handed on to government. . . . Today it is the
combined power of government and the corporations that presses against the
individual.

Reich, The New Property, supra note 132, at 773. Reich was quick to add that his view was not
intended as “anti-institutional,” but was simply a call to recognize that “the organizational
revolution of the present time has its costs in individual liberty and security that now demand
protection.” Reich, The Liberty Impact, supra note 144, at 304.
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Reich, An Ecological View, supra note 143, at 731, 733 (suggesting the community should
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Id. at 739.
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reasoned that society tolerates continued suffering in its midst because “we do not
feel responsible ourselves, and we do not feel that society is responsible. . . . It is
the premise of non-responsibility that allows us to look the other way.”152
Finally, in sharp relief from the distaste for environmental regulation
expressed by Epstein and his followers, Reich found a critical relationship
between environmental and social wellbeing, believing that “the idea of the
individual’s property is ecological. . . . Human life developed in organic
communities . . . [in which] the individual is not threatened by starvation or lack
of shelter unless the entire community is similarly threatened. . . .” 153 Reich
explained, “The crisis of the natural environment and the crisis of the unprotected
individual are similar. . . . The lakes, trees, and wildlife dying from acid rain and
the human beings dying on our city streets are alike in that they are victims of an
economic system out of control in that it denies and displaces its costs.154
The impact of The New Property has been profound, although Reich
himself was pessimistic that his larger message had been received. Writing thirty
years after publication of The New Property, Reich worried, “[t]he concept of new
property for the great mass of working Americans has been rejected, and with it
the promise of secure economic citizenship.”155 In contrast to Reich’s pessimism,
supporters and critics alike have cited to Reich’s work thousands of times, bearing
testimony to the enduring legacy of his work, and to its influence upon the way
scholars and jurists think about property.156
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Id. at 734.

155

Reich, The New Economic Order, supra note 132, at 819 (bemoaning, “[t]hirty years later, it is
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concept of individual economic rights”). Id., citing to Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 n.8
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2. The New Nuisance
[G]reed, for lack of a better word, is good. Greed is right, greed works. Greed
clarifies, cuts through, and captures the essence of the evolutionary spirit. Greed,
in all of its forms: greed for life, for money, for love, knowledge has marked the
upward surge of mankind. . . .
157

Wall Street (1987)

By the 1980s, society had cast off the previous generation’s worrisome
idealism, replacing it with the pragmatic pursuit of wealth and security. Like the
powerful industrialists a century earlier, corporate executives of the period were
tempted by opportunities to promote their individual wellbeing at the expense of
the community welfare, a temptation that the popular culture satirized in films
such as Wall Street.158 During this era, Ronald Reagan served as president159 and
Richard Epstein advanced his property rights philosophy.160 Against this historical
backdrop, the Supreme Court issued its 1992 opinion, Lucas v. S. Carolina
Coastal Council.161 In contrast to Reich’s concern for the rights of society’s
weakest members, the property reforms championed by Reich (and echoed in
Lucas) would cast a wider net, strengthening the rights of rich and poor alike.162
D.

From Lucas to Lingle: The Return of Community Safeguards?

After Lucas, the Supreme Court decided six additional regulatory takings
cases
before the era of the Rehnquist Court came to a close in 2005.164
163
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Arguably, the cases indicate a renewed concern for the public interest served by
land use and other environmental regulations, thereby restoring balance between
individual rights and community welfare.165
Two of the six post-Lucas cases are particularly instructive. In TahoeSierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (“TRPA”),166 six
members of the Court refused to hold that a total ban on development for thirtytwo months—during which the community finalized its comprehensive land use
plan—required compensation as a “total taking” under Lucas. 167 Instead, the
Court insisted that the delay suffered by the landowners was but one factor to be
measured against the competing public interest:
Our jurisprudence involving condemnations and physical takings is
as old as the Republic and, for the most part, involves the
straightforward application of per se rules. Our regulatory takings
jurisprudence, in contrast, is of more recent vintage and is
characterized by “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries” . . .
designed to allow “careful examination and weighing of all the
relevant circumstances.”168
This renewed focus upon the public interest was reinforced just three years later,
in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Incorporated.169 In that case, a unanimous Supreme
Court reversed course, rejecting its prior statement that government regulators
bear the burden of demonstrating that certain land use regulations “substantially
advance legitimate state interests.”170 In explicitly uncoupling the analytical
framework of regulatory takings from that of substantive due process,171 the Court
relieved the government of a heightened burden of proof, and once again restored
Court of the United States. On January 31, 2006, Samuel A. Alito, Jr. assumed the associate
justice position vacated by the retiring Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. Id.
165
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See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.255 (1980) (imposing requirement in context of
development exaction), abrogated by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
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Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540 (explaining that the “’substantially advances’ [test] . . . prescribes an
inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a takings test, and . . . it has no proper place in our
takings jurisprudence”).
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balance to the Penn Central analysis. The Court acknowledged that its
“substantially advance” detour had been an analytical mistake, and conceded that
it must “eat crow” to correct its error.172
After an initial period of flux, a similar pattern of regulatory tolerance
emerged from the post-Lucas decisions of the Federal Circuit.173 In the immediate
aftermath of Lucas, the Federal Circuit interpreted Lucas as signaling a “sea
change” favorable to the property rights of landowners. Under this view, the
government’s defense in all regulatory takings cases—spilling beyond the narrow
universe of Lucas total-takings cases—was restricted to background principles of
nuisance and property law. As a result, Penn Central’s wide-ranging balancing of
regulatory benefits and burdens was replaced with a cramped sphere of acceptable
government action. For example, in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s finding that the prohibition of
construction in a wetland constituted a regulatory taking.174 The court explained,
The effect, then, of Lucas was to dramatically change the third
criterion [of the Penn Central analysis], from one in which courts .
. . were called upon to . . . balanc[e] private property rights against
state regulatory policy, to one in which state property law,
incorporating common law nuisance doctrine, controls. This sea
change removed from regulatory takings the vagaries of the
balancing process. . . . It substituted instead a referent familiar to
property lawyers everywhere. . . .175
The Federal Circuit’s aggressive interpretation of property rights under Lucas
endured for a decade. In 2004, however, the Circuit announced its “return to the
pre-Lucas evaluation of the ‘character of the Government actions’ factor [of Penn
Central].”176 Thereafter, the court noted, it would adopt a “gestalt approach,”
evaluating both the purpose and desired effect of governmental regulation.177 As a
172
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175
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(characterizing the Loveladies Harbor analysis as a “Penn Central test with a Lucas gloss”).
176

Bass Enterprises Production Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

177

Id. at 1370. See also Maritrans Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 1344, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
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result, the Federal Circuit removed its judicial thumb from the “individual rights”
side of the individual-community balancing scale.
IV. W HAT’S NEW ABOUT NUISANCE? THE AFTERMATH OF LUCAS
The Lucas legacy represents one of the starkest recent examples of the law of
unintended consequences.”
Michael C. Blumm (2005)178
To the extent . . . that takings law has perceptibly shifted since the Court’s 1978
Penn Central ruling, it has arguably become more and not less difficult for
regulatory takings plaintiffs to prevail. . . . What Scalia [through Lucas] hoped
to serve as a per se takings rule proves, in its practical operation, to work more
often as a per se no takings rule.
Richard J. Lazarus (2006)179

This section will trace the post-Lucas development of the law of new
nuisance. In broad strokes, the discussion will consider the evolution of the
“antecedent inquiry” contemplated by the Lucas majority,180 as well as the
“changed circumstances or new knowledge” referenced by Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence. 181 This analysis will set the stage for Part V’s application of new
nuisance doctrine to three specific environmental problems: wetland
development, sprawling land use patterns, and global warming.
The first draft of this section produced a workmanlike, methodical
cataloguing of the extent to which new scientific learning has been incorporated
into the Lucas defense. As reported by Professors Blumm and Lazarus, Lucas left
a legacy surprisingly favorable to governmental defendants in the form of a new
defense that proved to be categorical in nature.182 Beyond confirming that
discovery, my subsequent work on the manuscript uncovered a second
unexpected development—Lucas may have contributed to a spillover effect,
reinvigorating the use of nuisance in its traditional offensive tort posture, outside
the context of a defense to regulatory takings claims.183 That is, as new ecological
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and other learning began to connect the dots between cause and effect, more
aggressive nuisance claims became viable.184
Third, yet another analytical surprise took shape, this time in the factual
context of climate change. As California initiated global warming legislation,
property rights advocates were largely silent. The regulatory takings challenges
that I had anticipated did not materialize.185 Instead, many in the regulated
community acquiesced, with some even calling for broad federal regulation. Can
this reaction be attributed, at least in part, to Lucas? The next section considers
this possibility. In addition, it describes in more detail the progression of new
nuisance law from Lucas defense, to common law offense, and beyond to catalyst
for legislative action.
A.

The New Posture: From Defense, to Offense, to Legislative Catalyst
1. New Nuisance as Defense

Lucas made clear that the new nuisance rule functions as an affirmative
defense to governmental liability in cases where regulation deprives property of
all economically beneficial use. Procedurally, the Court explained, the defense
should be considered as part of an “antecedent inquiry into the nature of the
owner’s estate,” during which the government bears the burden of “show[ing] that
the proscribed use interests were not part of [the landowner’s] title to begin
with.”186 In bearing its burden, the government may go beyond traditional public
and private nuisance, relying also upon “background principles of the State’s law
of property.”187 Concurring Justice Kennedy emphasized that in his view the
defense should be construed broadly, arguing that “the common law of nuisance
is too narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory power in a complex and
interdependent society.”188 Following this view, lower courts have applied a wide
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variety of takings defenses embedded in state nuisance and property law,189 both
common law and statutory.190
As the lower courts have worked through the ramifications of the Lucas
defense, at least two important developments have followed. First, as Professor
Blumm has noted, in some cases Lucas’s landowner-friendly categorical rule has
given way to a regulator-friendly categorical defense:
[R]ather than heralding in a new era of landowner compensation or
government deregulation, Lucas instead spawned a surprising rise
of categorical defenses to takings claims in which governments can
defeat compensation suits without case-specific inquiries into the
economic effects and public purposes of regulations. Lucas
accomplished this by establishing the prerequisite that a claimant
must first demonstrate that its property interest was unrestrained by
prior restrictions.191
The government’s defense becomes categorical primarily in cases where it rests
upon background principles of property (such as the public trust doctrine, the
natural use doctrine, the navigational servitude, customary rights, water law
principles, the wildlife trust, and Indian treaty rights), rather than upon principles
of nuisance.192
Second, although Lucas contemplates an antecedent inquiry into the
landowner’s property interest only in the case of total takings,193 lower courts
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See Blumm, supra note 178, at 367 (concluding that “over the past twelve years, nearly a dozen
distinct categories of Lucas-inspired threshold defenses have been proposed to and subsequently
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have begun to put landowner property interests under the microscope in all
takings cases.194 As a result, the principle question in a traditional takings
analysis—did the government go too far?195—has been postponed until after
consideration of the antecedent question, did the landowner go too far?196 In
practical terms, this has leveled the playing field between public and private
interests. It might also defuse the modern one-sided rhetoric of rights that portrays
landowners as the victims of governmental regulators, without regard for
important community values that government regulations may protect.197 As a
result of this preliminary opportunity to state their case, regulators can now defeat
takings liability during the early stages of litigation by demonstrating that the
landowner never had the unfettered right to engage in the regulated activity. In
such cases, courts need not address the additional Penn Central factors that may
favor landowners, including the degree of interference with reasonable,
investment-backed expectations, and the economic impact of the challenged
regulation.198
2. New Nuisance as Offense
By focusing attention upon the traditional doctrine of nuisance, Lucas
breathed new life into an old body of law, turning it into an important
governmental defense. Moreover, this attention to defensive nuisance may have
triggered a renewed appreciation of the doctrine’s usefulness in its more common
offensive posture.199 It is impossible to demonstrate a precise cause-and-effect
relationship between Lucas and subsequent affirmative nuisance actions.
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that a number of novel nuisance lawsuits were filed
in the fifteen years following Lucas. Among these are public nuisance claims filed
against nontraditional defendants—the manufacturers of products such as guns,
through measures taken by the claimant and the government (or adjacent private
landowners) alike. . . .
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031-32
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See Blumm, supra note 178, at 322, 326 (asserting that “[i]n effect, the Lucas decision
fundamentally revised all takings analysis by making the nature of the landowner’s property rights
a threshold issue in every takings case”).
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See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).

196

See supra note.
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See supra Part I.
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See supra note and accompanying text.

199

See, e.g., Louise A. Halper, Untangling the Nuisance Knot, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 89,
91 (1998) (asserting that the law of regulatory takings has “restored” the law of nuisance “to the
agenda of regulators, legislators, and planners”). But see Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public
Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOL. L.Q. 755 (2001).
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lead paint, tobacco,200 and automobiles.201 Post-Lucas lawsuits have also alleged
nontraditional harms, such as the loss of a subsistence fishing lifestyle caused by
an Alaskan oil spill,202 or warming of the global climate caused by the emission of
carbon dioxide by electrical utilities and automobiles.203
3.

New Nuisance as Legislative Catalyst

The new interest in both defensive and offensive nuisance—as triggered
by Lucas—may serve to clarify the relationship between developmental activities
and negative environmental consequences. As courts connect the dots between
cause and effect, actors may become more cognizant of their potential liability for
actions that harm wetlands, disrupt natural lands, and release greenhouse gases
into the atmosphere. As legal precedent and new learning evolve—and as liability
becomes more likely—the industry decision making process will undoubtedly
respond.
At some undefined tipping point, it may become more cost effective for
the regulated community to shape, rather than resist, legislation.204 As a result,
industry may find it more favorable to engage in the development of
comprehensive, federal legislation than to initiate numerous, individual takings
lawsuits. Moreover, some entrepreneurial actors may come to embrace federal
legislation as a consistent baseline that creates a potentially profitable market for
technological innovation. Those who adapt first may find lucrative opportunities
to develop compliance tools that others may adopt.
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See Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance: Maintaining Rational
Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541 (2006).
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See infra Part V.C.
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See Alaska Native Class v. Exxon Corp., 104 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting plaintiffs’
claim for failure to demonstrate that they suffered a special injury different in kind, rather than
degree, from all citizens of Alaska).
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See infra Part V.C.
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Dean Scott, Boucher Tells Coal Industry Bill is Coming; Pelosi, Dingell End Dispute Over
Select Panel, 38 Env’t Reporter 302, Feb. 9, 2007 (describing warning by head of House of
Representatives energy subcommittee to coal industry “that federal legislation limiting greenhouse
gas emissions is inevitable and that it would be better off working with Congress on a proposal
than risk facing a more stringent bill from the next administration”).
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B.

The New Learning: Environmental Connectivity
[C]hanged circumstances or new knowledge may make what was previously
permissible no longer so.
Justice Kennedy205
New appreciation of the significance of endangered species; the importance of
wetlands; and the vulnerability of coastal lands shapes our evolving
understandings of property rights.
Justice Stevens206

The contemporary emphasis on rights rather than responsibility has
skewed the current perception of the natural world. In particular, community
efforts to protect the environment have been construed as “taking” something
away from regulated actors, but there has been little serious consideration of
whether individual development activities may also “take” something away from
the community. As science learns more about the ecological consequences of
human development activity, it becomes apparent that just as public interest
regulation may adversely impact certain developers, so also may those developers
have adverse impacts upon their neighbors. The doctrine of regulatory takings has
been slow to recognize this two-way relationship. In theory, traditional takings
law has long recognized a nuisance exception under which landowners are not
entitled to compensation when they are precluded from using their land to create a
nuisance.207 In actual practice, however, some modern courts have been reluctant
to recognize that common development activities may actually harm the
community in a nuisance-like fashion.208
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Lucas, 505 U.S. (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also Reich, An Ecological View, supra note
143, at 744 (concluding that “[t]he environmental principle should warn us that, because all life is
interconnected, none of us can escape the consequences of suffering in our midst”).
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Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1069-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (requiring no compensation where law
prohibited manufacture of alcoholic beverages); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)
(requiring no compensation where ordinance prohibited operation of a brick yard within city
limits); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (requiring no compensation where government
ordered destruction of diseased cedar trees to protect neighboring orchards); Goldblatt v.
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (requiring no compensation where law impeded quarry operation
in residential area).
208

See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1024 (reasoning that “the distinction between ‘harm-preventing’
[without compensation] and ‘benefit-conferring’ [requiring compensation] regulation is often in
the eye of the beholder” and concluding that it is quite possible “to describe in either fashion the
ecological, economic, and aesthetic concerns that inspired the South Carolina legislature in the
present case”).
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Modern scholarship has begun to identify the correlation between action
and consequence. In particular, some scholars have begun to recognize what this
article calls environmental connectivity, the relationship between the development
of land (and the use of other natural resources) and community welfare. This body
of work moves beyond the traditional narrative under which the government
“takes” and the land developer “gives” (jobs and other benefits), recognizing
instead a bilateral relationship. At least three broad theoretical aspects of this
literature are particularly relevant to the issue of regulatory takings.
First, the field of law and economics has developed the concept of
“externalities,” the recognition that actions often have spillover effects not fully
borne by the actors.209 As long as these externalities remain unidentified, actors
are able to escape responsibility for the full consequences of their negative
externalities, and fail to receive recognition for the full scope of their positive
externalities. Government, therefore, must carefully identify the complete range
of externalities flowing from a particular action before it can fashion any effective
system of regulations, incentives, or rewards. In other words, it is a proper role of
government to “internalize” externalities,210 thereby requiring actors to absorb the
negative impacts of their actions, rather than to foist them onto the community.
A second aspect of the new learning specifically applies the economic
theory of externalities to the law of regulatory takings. Contrary to the
conventional wisdom—which begins with a concern for fairness to landowners—
some modern scholars have emphasized fairness to communities. For example, an
article in the Yale Law Journal entitled Givings211 examines the positive
externalities of numerous government programs, ranging from zoning changes
beneficial to certain property owners, to relaxation of environmental regulations,
to the granting of licenses.212 Restating traditional takings doctrine from the
perspective of the community, the authors argue,
[I]t is inequitable to bestow a benefit upon some people that, in all
fairness and justice, should be given to the public as a whole. In a
giving, a small group is able to force the public as a whole to
subsidize the group’s preferential treatment. For example, when
the state permits logging companies to chop down trees in national
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See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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See, e.g., Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A Pluralist
Interpretation, 91 CORNELL L.R. 653, 655 (2006).
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Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547 (2001).
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Id. at 549.
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forests for lumber, it is forcing the public as a whole to surrender
natural resources for the private profit of the logging companies.213
Asserting that “takings and givings are so inextricably related that one cannot
have a coherent takings jurisprudence without an attendant giving
jurisprudence,”214 the authors construct an elaborate model for identifying,
assessing, and collecting fair charges for givings.215 As an alternative method to
promote an evenhanded application of the takings doctrine, some scholars use the
language of “rights,” recognizing the rights of communities (as receptors), as well
as the rights of property owners (as generators). In the context of pollution, these
scholars argue that the law should focus upon the property rights of “receptors” of
pollutants, rather than the “generators” of pollution.216 They conclude that the
present system “effectively subsidize[s] polluters by permitting then to deposit
waste into public and private property and to use the population as test subjects
while unconstitutionally taking their property rights.”217
A third strand of modern learning studies and quantifies the numerous
benefits produced by a healthy ecosystem. Stanford conservation biologist
Gretchen Daily and others conducted pioneering research in “ecosystem
services,”218 observing that “environments of interacting plants, animals, and
microbes . . . can be seen as capital assets, supplying human beings with a stream
of services that sustain and enhance our lives.”219 Their work seeks to “measure,
capture, and protect the newly discovered values before they are lost.220
213

Id. at 554. Compare Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (explaining that the
takings clause prevents the government from “forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole”).
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Robert H. Cutting and Lawrence B. Cahoon, Thinking Outside the Box: Property Rights as a
Key to Environmental Protection, 22 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 55 (2005).
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Id. See also Joseph L. Sax, Essay: Why America Has a Property Rights Movement, 2005 U.
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See NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS (Gretchen C.
Daily ed., 1997); GRETCHEN C. DAILY & KATHERINE ELLISON, THE NEW ECONOMY OF NATURE:
THE QUEST TO MAKE CONSERVATION PROFITABLE (2002). See also Salzman et al., Protecting
Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309 (2001); Robert L.
Fischman, The EPA’s NEPA Duties and Ecosystem Services, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 497 (2001);
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Ecosystem services can provide a broad range of benefits to society, often quite
unexpected. For example, the 2005 book Last Child in the Woods: Saving Our
Children From Nature-Deficit Disorder argues that the modern alienation from
nature—termed “nature deficit disorder”—damages children, and that exposure to
nature could provide a therapy for depression, obesity, and attention-deficit
disorder.221 A related body of work studies “natural capital,” defined as “the stock
that yields the flow of natural resources—the population of fish in the ocean that
regenerates the flow of caught fish that go to market; the standing forest that
regenerates the flow of cut timber. . . .”222 Natural capital yields both natural
resources and natural services.223 Like traditional forms of capital, these scholars
argue, natural capital should be maintained intact.224 Still other scholars focus on
reform of cost-benefit analysis. They argue that ecosystem services and natural
capital are consistently undervalued in cost-benefit analyses because such assets
are external to traditional economic markets.225 Overall, the literature on
externalities, givings, ecosystem services, and related disciplines provides fertile
support for the modern evolution of nuisance doctrine, as stimulated by Lucas.
V. THE NEW NUISANCE APPLIED: CONNECTING THE DOTS
This section applies the new nuisance doctrine to three difficult
environmental problems—wetland development, sprawling land use patterns, and
global warming. Each problem is exacerbated, in part, when landowners,
developers, and ordinary citizens are allowed to harm environmental resources
without bearing (or perhaps even knowing) the full economic, environmental, and
social costs of their actions. As considered below, new nuisance law may be an
appropriate vehicle to allocate these environmental costs, shifting responsibility
back to the actors whose enterprises inflict nuisance-like harms upon society.
The discussion begins with a survey of the evolving new knowledge of the
relationship between environmental destruction and public harm. It then traces
three aspects of the post-Lucas evolution of the law: 1) the extent to which
communities have successfully asserted the Lucas affirmative defense to avoid
221
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takings liability for wetland, land use, and global warming regulation; 2) the
extent to which offensive public nuisance lawsuits have succeeded when alleging
environmental harms; and 3) the extent to which the new learning has induced the
regulated community to accept responsibility for its actions, paving the way for
the passage of new environmental legislation likely to escape facial challenge
under the regulatory takings doctrine.
A.

Wetland Destruction as New Nuisance
1.

The New Learning on Wetlands

Swamps and wetlands were once considered wasteland, undesirable, and not
picturesque. But as the people became more sophisticated, an appreciation was
acquired that swamps and wetlands serve a vital role in nature, are part of the
balance of nature and are essential to the purity of the water in our lakes and
streams. Swamps and wetlands are a necessary part of the ecological creation
and now, even to the uninitiated, possess their own beauty in nature.
Just v. Marinette County (1972)226

Modern studies have revealed that wetlands perform a vast range of
ecosystem services for the community. The Environmental Protection Agency has
identified at least five such functions;227 and studies have begun to quantify the
economic value of the services performed.228 First, wetlands improve water
quality by processing, decomposing, and trapping inorganic nutrients, organic
wastes, and suspended solids that would otherwise pollute surface waters.229 Sitespecific studies have valued this service in excess of one million dollars for
individual communities.230 Second, wetlands provide protection against floods,
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201 N.W. 2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972).
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See United States Env’tl Protection Agency, Functions and Values of Wetlands (hereinafter,
EPA, Functions and Values) (EPA 843-F-01-002c, September 2001), available at
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/fun_val.pdf (visited July 18, 2006).
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See, e.g., Edward B. Berbier et al., Economic Valuation of Wetlands: A Guide for Policy
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(visited July 18, 2006)); North Carolina State University, Water Quality Group, Wetland
Functions and Values, available at http://h2osparc.wq.ncsu.edu/info/wetlands/funval.html (visited
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available at http://water.usgs.gov/nwsum/WSP2425/functions.html (visited July 18, 2006).
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See William S. Sipple, United States EPA Office of Water, Wetland Functions and Values,
available at http://www.epa.gov/watertrain/wetlands/index.htm (visited July 18, 2006).
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Two examples utilized by the EPA include the Congaree Bottomland Hardwood Swamp of
South Carolina (“removing a quantity of pollutants that would be equivalent to that removed
annually by a $5 million waste water treatment plant” according to a 1990 study) and a 2500 acre
wetland in Georgia (saving one million dollars annually in pollution abatement costs). Id. at
Section 5. Wetlands improve the flow (or hydrology) of water, as well as its quality. For example,
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hurricanes, and shoreline erosion by storing excess waters and releasing them
slowly.231 A Minnesota study found that the draining of five thousand wetland
acres destroyed natural flood control valued at $1.5 million annually.232 Even
more striking, a Mississippi River basin study found that wetland destruction and
levee construction had reduced the basin’s natural storage capacity from sixty
days of floodwater to twelve days of floodwater.233 Third, wetlands provide
habitat for fish, wildlife, and plants, making them “some of the most biologically
productive natural ecosystems in the world, comparable to tropical rain forests
and coral reefs . . . .”234 This habitat supports a commercial and recreational
fishing industry valued at approximately seventy-nine billion dollars annually.235
Fourth, wetlands help to maintain favorable atmospheric conditions by storing
carbon in peat, thus helping to control global warming. When drained or filled,
wetlands release the carbon as carbon dioxide, a greenhouse gas that affects the
earth’s climate.236 Finally, wetlands provide aesthetic, recreational, and
educational opportunities. Studies estimate that Americans spend more than fiftynine billion dollars annually in connection with wetland hunting, fishing,
birdwatching, and wildlife photography.237

“[o]ne calculation for a 5-acre Florida cypress swamp recharging groundwater was that, if 80
percent of swamp was drained, available ground water would be reduced by an estimated 45
percent.” Id.
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Id. at Section 6.
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Id. The EPA estimates that a single wetland acre can store up to 1.5 million gallons of
floodwater. EPA, Functions and Values, supra note. Citing to the 38 deaths and billions of dollars
of damage caused by the 1993 upper Mississippi River Basin flood, the EPA commented,
“Historically, 20 million acres of wetlands in this area had been drained or filled, mostly for
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2.

Defending Wetland Regulations

Coastal property may present such unique concerns for a fragile land system that
the State can go further in regulating its development and use than the common
law of nuisance might otherwise permit.
Justice Kennedy (1992)238

a. Wetland destruction as categorical defense: In the post-Lucas era, a
number of state and federal courts have held that governmental efforts to protect
wetlands do not constitute regulatory takings because wetland destruction
constitutes a nuisance. Often, these courts apply the new nuisance defense of
Lucas, in the context of a Penn Central balancing analysis.239 The state courts of
Massachusetts,240 Pennsylvania241 and Rhode Island242 have based their holdings
238

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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See Blumm, supra note 178, at 327 (discussing background principles as categorical takings
defense) and 336 (arguing that a “nuisance defense is particularly appropriate in the case of
wetlands protection”).
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See Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Blair, 2000 WL 875903 (Mass. Super. 2000)
(unreported decision) (rejecting takings challenge to state statute prohibiting the alteration of land
within 200 feet of surface waters within protected watersheds supplying public drinking water),
affirmed as modified, Commonwealth v. Blair, 805 N.E.2d 1011 (Mass. App. 2004). The trial
court held:
The rights of a property owner to utilize lakefront property comes with
significant limitations when the regulatory concern is for the health and welfare
of society. Conduct affecting a public resource, such as public water supplies,
that could be actionable at common law . . . under a public nuisance theory, may
be aptly regulated, or at minimum, be regulated with a decreased risk of having
the regulation adjudicated an unconstitutional taking. . . . The character of the
government action here, therefore, is much akin to prohibiting acts which may
have been prohibited, at least in part, at common law prior to the enactment of
the [challenged statute] in 1992.
Id. at *7. The appellate court did not disturb this holding in its modified affirmance. See also Gove
v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Chatham, 831 N.E.2d 865 (Mass. 2005) (rejecting takings
challenge to denial of permit to build single-family house on undeveloped land within coastal
conservancy district). The trial court had found that the subject property was located within a flood
plain, and that construction of the proposed house would pose a danger to neighboring
landowners. Gove, 831 N.E. 2d at 875. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded, “[r]easonable
government action mitigating such harm, at the very least when it does not involve a ‘total’
regulatory taking or a physical invasion, typically does not require compensation.” Id.
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See Machipongo Land and Coal Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 799 A.2d 751
(Pa. 2002) (rejecting takings challenge to state regulation designating particular watershed as
unsuitable for mining). Independent of evidence that the proposed mining operation would destroy
a trout population and adversely impact water supply, the Court stated, “We have explained that
“we believe that the public has a sufficient interest in clean streams alone regardless of any
specific use thereof . . . [to warrant] injunctive relief.” Id. at 774, quoting Commonwealth v.
Barnes & Tucker Co., 319 A.2d, 871, 882 (Pa. 1974).
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on explicit findings that the destruction of wetlands or other aquatic resources
constitutes a public nuisance.
Of particular interest to government regulators is the final resolution of the
decades-long Palazzolo litigation.243 In 1985, a Rhode Island landowner sought
permission to fill and develop approximately eighteen acres of coastal salt
marsh.244 The relevant state agency denied permission pursuant to state
regulation.245 The landowner brought an inverse condemnation action, alleging
that denial of his application constituted a regulatory taking. Ultimately, the case
was heard by the United States Supreme Court, which held that the claim was ripe
for review, and that the landowner’s acquisition of title after the effective date of
the state’s wetland regulation was not an automatic bar to the takings claim.246
Finding that the challenged regulation had not deprived the petitioner of all
economically beneficial use of his property, the Court remanded for a resolution
of the takings claim under the Penn Central test.247 In an earlier phase of the
litigation, the Rhode Island trial court had found that the contemplated wetland
development would constitute a public nuisance.248 Eight years later, on remand
from the United States Supreme Court, the trial court again found that the
proposed wetland development would be a public nuisance.249 The court
concluded that, without more, nuisance would serve as a “preclusive defense” to
the landowner’s takings claims:250
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The State has presented evidence as to various effects that the
development will have including increasing nitrogen levels in the
pond, both by reason of the nitrogen produced by the attendant
residential septic systems, and the reduced marsh area which
actually filters and cleans runoff. This Court finds that the effects
of increased nitrogen levels constitute a predictable (anticipatory)
nuisance which would almost certainly result in an ecological
disaster to the pond. . . . Nor is the proposed high density
subdivision suitable for the salt marsh environs presented here.251
In so concluding, the court was impressed by the array of ecosystem services that
would be curtailed by the filling of coastal marshlands.252
In contrast to these regulatory-friendly decisions in Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island, courts in the Federal Circuit have specifically
rejected the new nuisance defense of Lucas four times before or during 2001.
These decisions have been based on the law of nuisance in the states of
California,253 Florida,254 Delaware,255 and New Jersey,256 with the federal court
251

Id.

252

Id.
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Forest Properties, Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999). In Forest, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the trial court’s finding that the proposed dredging and filling of a lake bottom to
promote residential construction would not constitute a nuisance under California law. 177 F.3d at
1366. Nevertheless, the court rejected the takings challenge, finding that the landowner lacked
reasonable expectations that it could develop its property as proposed. See supra note.
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See Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 21 (1999) (finding that denial of
§ 404 permit in connection with limestone mining operation constituted a regulatory taking). The
court concluded,
[P]laintiff’s limestone mining operation would, like similar operations in the
vicinity, result in only moderate, superficial pollution that does no harm, and
would not be considered a nuisance under the relevant Florida laws. Indeed,
plaintiff’s operation was suitably located in the community and designed to help
meet the community’s need for aggregates to be used in construction.
Id. at 28-31.
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See Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248 (2001). In Walcek, the Court of Federal Claims
found, “[t]here is no significant evidence in this case that the plaintiffs’ proposed use of the
Property [filling and development of salt marsh] would formally constitute a nuisance under
Delaware state law so that the application of the Federal wetland regulations could be viewed as
enforcing a limitation already inherent in the Property.” Id. at 270. Nevertheless, the court rejected
the takings challenge, finding acceptable the character of the government action to protect
wetlands.
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See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding denial of
§ 404 permit to constitute a regulatory taking, denying landowner of all economically beneficial
use of New Jersey wetland property). The Federal Circuit agreed with the trial court’s conclusion
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concluding that government defendants failed to demonstrate that their challenged
actions were designed to prevent common law nuisance under the relevant state’s
law.257 Importantly—despite rejecting the argument under Lucas that wetland
destruction is a nuisance under state law—two of these cases nevertheless held in
favor of the governmental defendants under the broader Penn Central test.258
b. Wetland destruction as nuisance-like balancing factor: Numerous
other courts have found that the fill or development of wetlands may cause
community harm, and that governments may regulate to prevent such harm
without providing compensation to the burdened landowner.259 These courts stop
short of describing wetland destruction as a “nuisance,” but has nevertheless been
willing to reject takings challenges to regulations that preclude nuisance-like
activities. This group includes the Federal Circuit,260 as well as the states of
that the federal defendant had failed to sustain its burden of proving that wetland filling
constituted a common law nuisance. Id. at 1183. Ironically, the Federal Circuit preceded its
holding in favor of the landowner with an impassioned paragraph extolling the value of wetlands:
There can be no doubt today that every effort must be made individually and
collectively to protect our natural heritage, and to pass it to future generations
unspoiled. The destruction of ancient civilizations by human misuse of the
environment, such as that at Ephesus, teaches the need for public policies that
work within the natural environment, rather than attempt radically to alter it.
Id. at 1175. Loveladies has been discredited on other grounds. See Bass Enterprises Production
Co., 381 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See also Mansoldo v. New Jersey, 898 A.2d 1018, 1025 (N.J.
2006) (rejecting argument that landowner’s stipulation to agency determination that proposed
development in flood plain “would pose a threat to other properties during a flood” constituted a
concession that intended use of property is a nuisance under Lucas).
257

But see John R, supra note (suggesting that in absence of controlling law in the relevant state,
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See Norman v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 231, 286 (2004) (rejecting takings challenge to
wetland mitigation requirement imposed to Nevada property under § 404 permitting process, and
approving character of government action “especially in light of the fact that the government has a
legitimate public welfare obligation to preserve wetlands and that the unnecessary destruction of
wetlands violates environmental laws and is contrary to public policy”); John R. Sand & Gravel
Co. v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 230, 243 (2004) (remanding for factual development of record in
takings challenge to administrative use of Michigan mining property during environmental
remediation of neighboring landfill, and suggesting that the pollution of ground water may
constitute a public or private nuisance); Brace v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 272, 278-79 (2000)
(remanding for factual development of record in takings challenge to administrative order
prohibiting drainage of wetlands, and approving character of the government action implementing
its “legitimate public welfare obligation to preserve our nation’s wetlands”).
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Alaska,261 Florida,262 Michigan,263 New Hampshire,264 New Jersey,265 New
York,266 Oregon,267 South Carolina,268 Washington,269 and Wisconsin.270
See also Walcek, supra note (rejecting takings challenge to issuance of § 404 permit allowing only
scaled-down version of proposed development). The Walcek court specifically rejected the
government’s nuisance defense, see supra note, but nevertheless approved the character of the
government action. Id. at 270 (opining that “the existence of the wetland regulations in question,
as well as their application to the Property, indisputably serve an important public purpose—one
which benefits plaintiffs as members of the public at large”). The court concluded, “while the
absence of a nuisance certainly cuts in favor of a finding of a taking, other circumstances in this
case [including the importance of preserving ecologically significant areas and the general
applicability of wetland regulations to all similarly situated property owners] ameliorate somewhat
the impact of the [character of the government action] Penn Central factor in this regard.” Id.
See also Forest Properties, supra note (rejecting takings challenge to denial of § 404 permit to
convert lake-bottom property into residential development). The Forest Properties court
specifically rejected the government’s nuisance defense, but nevertheless found that the developer
lacked reasonable investment-backed expectations because at the time the developer acquired an
option to purchase lake bottom property, “the Corps’ guidelines governing the issuance of Section
404 permits under the Clean Water Act had been in effect for a number of years,” making clear
that “filling wetlands to construct housing on the reclaimed land was disfavored and that it was
most unlikely that such a project would be approved.” Id. at 1366-67.
261

See R&Y, Inc. v. Anchorage, 34 P.3d 289 (Alaska 2001) (rejecting regulatory taking challenge
to municipal regulation prohibiting development within 100 feet of particular wetland). In
upholding the uncompensated governmental regulation, the Court noted the ecosystem services
provided by wetland, concluding, “In preserving the valuable functions of wetlands, regulations
like those of the [municipality of Anchorage] provide ecological and economic value to the
landowners whose surrounding commercially-developed land is directly and especially benefited
by the functioning of Blueberry Lake.” 34 P.3d at *298. The Court was influenced, in part, by the
comprehensive nature of wetlands regulation.
262

See Florida v. Burgess, 772 So. 2d 540 (Fla. App. 2000) (rejecting regulatory taking challenge
to denial of dredge-and-fill permit for construction of dock, boardwalk, and camping shelter on
undeveloped 160-acre wetland). The court rejected the claim that an undeveloped wetland was
valueless, concluding that the landowner “utterly failed to demonstrate that the permit denial
deprived him of all reasonable economic use of his land.” Id. at 543
See also Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981) (in pre-Lucas decision,
rejecting regulatory taking challenge to denial of development permit that would have destroyed
1800 acres of black mangrove wetland). In upholding the denial of the permit application, the
Court noted that, under the facts of the case, wetland development would pollute the surrounding
bays and “cause a public harm.” Id. at *1382-83 (stressing “the magnitude of [the] proposed
development and the sensitive nature of the surrounding lands and water to be affected by it”).
263

See K&K Construction, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envt’l Quality, 705 N.W. 2d 365 (Mich. App. 2005)
(reversing trial court takings award in amount of $16.5 million for denial of application for
dredge-and-fill permit). The court concluded that that the permit denial would prevent significant
harm to the public. Id. at 530 (citing to findings of state legislature that the “loss of a wetland may
deprive the people of the state of some or all of the . . . benefits to be derived from the wetland”).
The court was cognizant that its decision would prevent the developer from externalizing the costs
of wetland destruction: “Indeed, were we to uphold the trial court's award, we would, in effect,
single out plaintiffs to their benefit, [by] compensating plaintiffs for the loss of value of their
property, especially when it has a significant amount of value and development potential
remaining. . . . “ Id. at 563. See also Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W. 2d 58 (Mich. 2005), rehearing
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Although the nuisance determination is heavily fact-specific, the cases provide
fertile ground for extracting the factors likely to influence courts in future
litigation. It is useful to group those factors according to the relevant prong of the
three-part analysis established in Penn Central.

denied, 703 N.W. 2d 188 (Mich. 2005), cert. den. sub nom Goeckel v. Glass, 126 S.Ct. 1340
(2006) (generously interpreting the public trust doctrine to extend along the Great Lakes to the
ordinary high water mark landward of the wet sand).
264

See Claridge v. New Hampshire Wetlands Board, 485 A.2d 287, 292 (N.H. 1984) (in pre-Lucas
decision, holding that denial of permit to fill tidal marshes was not a taking because filling the
marsh would harm the public by irreparably diminishing the marsh’s nutrient-producing capability
for coastal habitats and marine fisheries). The court consciously grounded its decision in the new
learning on wetlands, observing that “[t]he dangers associated with filling wetlands have only
recently become widely known”). Id. at 292.
265

American Dredging Co. v. Dep’t of Envt’l Protection, 391 A.2d 1265, 1270 (N.J. 1978) (in preLucas decision, holding that there is “no absolute right to change the essential character” of land).
In 2006, however, the New Jersey Supreme Court required the state to compensate a landowner
who had been precluded from building two single-family homes in a river floodway, even though
the Court acknowledged “the laudatory goal of limiting flood damage and loss of life along the
river,” and that the regulation prevented a public danger to the community. Mansoldo v. State, 898
A.2d 1018, 1020-24 (N.J. 2006).
266

See Kim v. City of New York, 681 N.E. 2d 312 (N.Y. 1997).

267

See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456 (Ore. 1993), cert. den. 510 U.S. 1207
(1994) (rejecting takings claim where common law doctrine of custom precluded hotel from
erecting sea wall on dry sand area of Oregon beach).
268

See Grant v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 461 S.E. 2d 388, 391 (S.C. 1995) (rejecting takings
claim where landowner precluded from filling critical area tidelands under state tidelands statute).
But see Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992) (remand)
(asserting, “We have reviewed the record and heard arguments from the parties regarding whether
[the state] possesses the ability under the common law to prohibit Lucas from constructing a
habitable structure on his land. [The state] has not persuaded us that any common law basis exists
by which it could restrain Lucas’ desired use of his land; nor has our research uncovered any such
common law principle.”).
269

See Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 1073-83 (Wash. 1987), cert. den. 486 U.S. 1022
(1996) (rejecting takings claim where construction permit denied under public trust doctrine).
270

See Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W. 2d 761 (Wis. 1972) (in pre-Lucas decision, rejecting
takings challenge to county shoreland zoning ordinance establishing buffer zone along navigable
lakes and rivers along which the natural character of the land may not be changed without a
conditional use permit). The Court noted that the challenged ordinance was designed to protect
navigable waters and public rights from degradation and deterioration, and observed “the
interrelationship of the wetlands, the swamps and the natural environment of shorelands to the
purity of the water and to such natural resources as navigation, fishing, and scenic beauty.” 201
N.W.2d at 765, 768-69. See also Blumm, supra note, at 344-46 (discussing the “natural use
doctrine” of Just and its progeny).
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In a Penn Central analysis, courts first consider the economic impact of
the challenged regulation.271 In Lucas, the United States Supreme Court accepted
a case where the state supreme court had previously found that the challenged
regulation rendered the subject property “valueless.”272 Subsequent courts,
however, have demonstrated a less skeptical view of the worth of natural lands,
perhaps reflecting the evolution of scientific knowledge on the value of wetlands
and other aquatic resources.273 Moreover, even where wetland regulation has
deprived property of all value, the landowner may be required to demonstrate a
reasonable expectation that development would be allowed under the existing
regulatory climate.274
Under the second Penn Central factor, courts consider the landowner’s
reasonable investment-backed expectations.275 Wetland regulators have survived
takings liability in numerous cases due to the longstanding and comprehensive
regulation of wetlands under state and federal law. Some courts have invoked the
so-called “notice rule,”276 finding that landowner expectations of wetland
development cannot be reasonable for properties acquired after the effective date
of the federal Clean Water Act of 1972.277 Other courts date the federal regulatory
presence back to the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, rendering vulnerable
271

Cite.

272

See supra note.

273

See, e.g., Burgess, supra note. The court was influenced, in part, by the facts that “the
extensive, remote wetlands adjacent to appellee's property have remained undeveloped as has [the
claimant’s] property,” and that the claimant had made recreational use of his undeveloped property
for decades without the sought amenities. Id. at 543-44. See also Gove, supra note 258, 831 N.E.
2d at 872-73 (finding undeveloped coastal property to be worth at least $23,000).
274

See Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (affirming grant of summary
judgment in favor of federal defendant in takings challenge to denial of § 404 permit, and
asserting that the “Lucas Court did not hold that the denial of all economically beneficial or
product use of land eliminates the requirement that the landowner have reasonable, investmentbacked expectations of developing his land”).
275

Cite.

276

In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the United States Supreme Court rejected the proposition that the
purchase of lands subject to an existing regulatory scheme serves as an automatic bar to
compensation. Five Justices agreed to invalidate the so-called notice rule, under which a purchaser
or successive title holder of an earlier-enacted restriction is barred from asserting a regulatory
takings claim. See 533 U.S. at 626-27 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, and
Thomas, J.J.). Two Justices would find that the regulatory regime in place at the time the claimant
acquires the property helps to shape the reasonableness of the claimant’s investment-backed
expectations under a Penn Central analysis. See 533 U.S. at 632-36 (O’Connor, concurring) and
533 U.S. at 655 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
277

See, e.g., Norman, supra note; Brace, supra note; Good, supra note (granting government’s
motion for summary judgment on basis that landowner lacked expectations); Forest, supra note.

50

development expectations for regulated lands purchased any time after that
date.278 Development expectations are also more likely to fail the reasonableness
test when held by sophisticated or commercial landowners who may be held to a
higher standard of subjective awareness of the relevant regulatory restrictions on
wetland development.279
Finally, courts consider the character of the government action under Penn
Central.280 Whereas some courts have viewed the existence of a pervasive
regulatory scheme as evidence that development expectations are unreasonable,281
other courts have considered such regulations as evidence that the government
action is of an acceptable character. According to this view, the more pervasive
the statutory program, the more likely it is to promote an “average reciprocity of
advantage,” treating all similarly-situated landowners equally, and spreading the
burden of regulation across a wider spectrum of property.282 Courts are also more
likely to find a reciprocity of advantage where surrounding properties are
similarly restricted.283 Moreover, courts are increasingly willing to uphold
government actions intended to protect ecosystem services against harmful
development activities.284 Finally, if governmental actions are demonstrated to
abate a nuisance—even outside the context of a total taking under Lucas—some
courts have found this to be a complete defense to liability, without consideration
of the additional Penn Central factors.285

278

See Walcek, supra note (pre-Palazzolo decision).

279

See Norman, supra note, at 531 (involving “sophisticated investors”); K&K, supra note (stating
that “plaintiffs are experienced commercial land developers who clearly had or were on notice of
the [state] wetland regulations.”).
280

Cite.

281

See supra notes.

282

See R&Y, supra note, 34 P.3d at *298 (observing that Anchorage’s setback restriction was “part
of a city-wide (indeed, nationwide) wetlands preservation scheme which applies broadly to all
landowners and which benefits both the public generally and the landowners in particular”); K&K,
supra note, 705 N.W. 2d at 531 (opining that wetland regulations, “much like traditional zoning
regulations, [are] comprehensive, universal, and ubiquitous”).
283

See Burgess, supra note; Walcek, supra note; Florida Rock, supra note.

284

See Palazzolo, supra note; R&Y, supra note; Graham, supra note ; K&K, supra note; Claridge,
supra note; American Dredging, supra note; Machipongo, supra note.
285

See also Norman, supra note (discussing background principles); John R, supra note (in
context of physical taking, finding that nuisance can serve as background principle precluding
liability); and Machipongo, supra note. See also Blumm, supra note 178, at (discussing Lucas’
unanticipated consequence of spawning a categorical defense to regulatory takings claims).
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3.

Wetland Protection as Offensive Claim

Because wetlands are critical to flood control, water supply, water quality, and,
of course, wildlife, their rapid disappearance is setting the stage for what may
eventually become a significant environmental catastrophe.
Sabine River Authority v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior (1992)286

Perhaps stimulated by Lucas’s focus upon the potential link between
nuisance and wetland development, lower courts have increasingly recognized the
value of wetlands. Going beyond mere rhetoric, in the wake of Lucas, at least one
court has found that wetland destruction constitutes an affirmative nuisance. In
Cook v. Sullivan, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that constructing a
home on jurisdictional wetlands constituted a private nuisance.287 Most
noteworthy is the court’s remedy, which required the defendants to move the
offending house and foundation a distance of approximately fifty feet.288
Although acknowledging the severity of the remedy, the trial court—as affirmed
by the state supreme court—found such measures to be justified where the
defendants deliberately ignored the obvious presence of wetlands and filled them
without a permit.289
B.

Sprawl as New Nuisance
There is a connection . . . between the fact that the urban sprawl we live with
daily makes no room for sidewalks or bike paths and the fact that we are an
overweight, heart disease-ridden society.
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (2002)290
[Urban] sprawl has left some densely populated U.S. regions vulnerable to
flooding on a similar scale to what the Gulf Coast suffered after Hurricane
291
Katrina.

286

Sabine River Authority v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 951 F.2d 669, 671-72 (5th Cir. 1992)
(describing wetlands as “an ecological treasure”). See also Allison v. Barberry Homes, Inc., 2000
WL 1473121, *3 (Mass. Super. 2000) (rejecting “ironic” claim that creation of wetland constitutes
a private nuisance, and stating that wetlands “are a precious resource—not a nuisance”).
287

Cook v. Sullivan, 829 A.2d 1059 (N.H. 2003) (finding private nuisance where defendants’
construction caused standing water to accumulate in and beneath structures on neighboring
property of plaintiffs).
288

Id. at 1067-68.

289

Id.

290

Richard J. Jackson & Chris Kochtitzky, Creating a Healthy Environment: The Impact of the
Built Environment on Public Health 11 (2002), available at www.sprawlwatch.org (citing study
by researchers at the National Center for Environmental Health, Center for Disease Control and
Prevention).
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The pattern of sprawling land use typically associated with low density,
suburban housing has engendered both detractors and supporters. Although the
negative impacts of sprawl have received considerable study, many suburban
developers and residents vigorously support the “right to sprawl,”292 citing to the
privacy, convenience, and safety they believe the suburban landscape provides.293
In appropriate cases, new nuisance theory might be a tool capable of balancing
such perceived benefits and detriments, ensuring that a fair share of the negative
costs of sprawl are borne by those who generate them. A growing body of
literature has documented the adverse, nuisance-like impacts of sprawl.
1.

The New Learning on Sprawl

a. Economic impacts: Perhaps the best-studied impacts of sprawl are
those of an economic nature. Low-density development increases the per-capita
cost of infrastructure such as roads, sewer lines, and water lines.294 In addition,
the isolation of residential land uses from areas zoned for shopping, employment,
and service centers causes increased dependence upon the automobile, which in
turn causes increased air pollution, traffic congestion, and gasoline consumption.
Providing a classic illustration of externalities, these costs may be reflected in the
taxes of the entire region, whereas the benefits of sprawl may be enjoyed
primarily by suburban residents.295 For example, a Rutgers University study found
291

Scientists: California, St. Louis Risk Katrina-Level Floods, USA TODAY, Feb. 19, 2006,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/2006-02-19-flooding_x.htm?POE=click-refer
(citing Jeffrey Mount, University of California, for proposition that “[urban] sprawl has left some
densely populated U.S. regions vulnerable to flooding on a similar scale to what the Gulf Coast
suffered after Hurricane Katrina”)

292

Lester Graham, The Right to Sprawl,
http://www.glrc.org/transcript.php3?story_id=1888.

May

5,

2003,

available

at

293

See Bill Bishop, Urban Sprawl Makes Comeback, LEXINGTON-HERALD-LEADER, Mar. 14,
1999, at F1 (“Sprawl doesn’t hurt anybody. . . . [It] is the American dream.”), cited in Timothy J.
Dowling, Reflections on Urban Sprawl, Smart Growth, and the Fifth Amendment, 148 UNIV.
PENN. L. REV. 873, 874 n.4 (2000).
294

See ROBERT H. FREILICH, FROM SPRAWL TO SMART GROWTH: SUCCESSFUL LEGAL, PLANNING,
ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS I23-24 (1999) (citing study by Urban Land Institute), cited in
Dowling, Reflections, supra, at 875 n.16. The cost of sprawl has also been studied at the statewide level. See, e.g., Maine State Planning Office, The Cost of Sprawl 10 (1997), available at
http://www.state.me.us/spo/files/spraw (finding that expenditures for education, roads, and police
by Maine state and local governments “increased in real dollars . . . during the 1980s [by] a total of
over $1300 per Maine household” and concluding that “[i]t is beyond dispute that the spreading
out of Maine families is a major contributing factor to the overall increase”), cited in Dowling,
supra at 876 n.17
AND
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See, e.g., Lester Graham, Hidden Costs of Sprawl, GREAT LAKES RADIO CONSORTIUM, June 24,
2002, available at www.glrc.org/transcripts/2002/06/24/graham.htm; MYRON ORFIELD,
AMERICAN METROPOLITICS: THE NEW SUBURBAN REALITY (2002).
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that prohibiting sprawl would have an economic impact of $357 million upon a
limited number of landowner/developers over twenty years, whereas permitting
sprawl would cost state residents $8 billion for otherwise unnecessary
infrastructure.296
b. Environmental impacts: Sprawling development exacerbates a variety
of environmental problems. It increases air pollution by increasing automobile
dependence, which in turn generates additional pollution in the operation of cars
and in the production of gasoline to fuel them. In addition, low-density
development increases the consumption of wildlife habitat, agricultural lands, and
water, as such areas may give way to suburban lawns, described by one researcher
as “the largest irrigated crop in the U.S.”297 Sprawl also increases water pollution,
either through the application of nitrogen-rich fertilizers to large suburban lawns
or through the use of septic tanks as an inexpensive alternative to municipal sewer
lines.298 Furthermore, the conversion of forests and farmland to suburban
development has been linked to climate change and global warming.299
c. Human health and safety impacts: The association between air
pollution, respiratory illness, and sprawl has long been studied. More recently,
researchers have begun to explore the link between urban design and an expanded
range of health impacts, including heart disease, diabetes, obesity, asthma, and
depression.300 The sprawl-obesity link has received particular attention.301 An
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See Robert W. Burchell et al., Impact Assessment of the New Jersey Interim State Development
and Redevelopment Plan (Rutgers Univ., Ctr. for Pol’y Research, 1992), cited in Henry R.
Richmond, Sprawl and Its Enemies: Why the Enemies are Losing, 34 CONN. L. REV. 539, 577-78
(2001).
297

See Elizabeth Weise, As Suburbs Grow, So do Environmental Fears, USA TODAY, Dec. 30,
2005 (quoting Jennifer Jenkins, professor of environmental economics at the University of
Vermont).
298

Id. (citing December 2005 report by the American Geophysical Union, an international
association of scientists).
299

See Amy Meersman, NCAR Study: Land Use Affects Climate, DAILY CAMERA (Boulder), Dec.
9, 2005 (citing study by the National Center for Atmospheric Research indicating that
deforestation will add at least two degrees Celsius to Amazon surface temperatures by the year
2100); National Resources Conservation Service, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 1997 National Resources
Inventory Highlights 1 (1999) (documenting doubling of national rate of development from 19821992 to 1992-1997, and noting development of six million acres of U.S. forest, farmland, and
private open space from 1992-97). In contrast, the expansion of agricultural lands can counteract
global warming by as much as 50% across various portions of North America, Europe, and Asia.
Meersman, supra.

300

From 1960-97, vehicle miles traveled in the United States increased by more than 250%.
Jackson & Kochtitzky, supra, at 6, citing U.S. Dep’t of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation
Statistics, Journey-to-Work Trends in the United States and its Major Metropolitan Areas, 19601990, available at http://ntl.bts.gov/DOCS/473.html. The average annual driving time of
American drivers is 443 hours, the equivalent of 11 work weeks. Jackson & Kochtizky, supra, at
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emerging subset of the sprawl literature studies the phenomenon of “school
sprawl”—the siting of sprawling, single-story, modern schools at the edge of
town or in areas lacking sidewalks and bicycle paths.302 Increasingly, children are
unable to walk to school, which in turn increases the occurrence of inactivityrelated ailments.303 With respect to public safety, some scientists have suggested
that sprawling population patterns may increase the danger of flood-related harm.
They believe that “[u]rban sprawl has left some densely populated U.S. regions
vulnerable to flooding on a similar scale to what the Gulf Coast suffered after
Hurricane Katrina,” including the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta of California
and a fourteen thousand acre zone in the Mississippi River floodplain of St.
Louis.304 One researcher has asked, “If we knew about [Hurricane] Katrina 200
years ago, would we have done the same thing again in New Orleans? . . . Well, in
California we are reinventing our own Katrina as we speak.305
d. Social and intangible impacts: Some studies indicate that
deconcentrated land patterns contribute to abandonment of urban communities,
undercuts economic productivity, denies equal opportunity, destabilizes older
suburbs, undercuts education investments, reduces public safety, and worsens
traffic congestion.306 Other work suggests that sprawl may contribute to the
6, citing CARL POPE, SOLVING SPRAWL
http://www.sierraclub.org/sprawl/report99/index.asp.

(Sierra

Club

1999),

available

at
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Among American adults, 64.5% are overweight and 30.5% are obese, leading to more than
300,000 premature deaths annually. Such weight-related deaths are the second leading cause of
preventable death, following tobacco-related deaths. Reid Ewing et al., Relationship Between
Urban Sprawl and Physical Activity, Obesity, and Morbidity, 18 AMERICAN J. OF HEALTH
PROMOTION 47, 54 (September/October 2003) (peer-reviewed study) (citing various studies
published in the Journal of the American Medical Association). See also Russ Lopez, Urban
Sprawl and Risk for Being Overweight or Obese, 94 AMERICAN J. OF PUBLIC HEALTH 1574
(2004); Arlin Wassereman, Gaining Weight: Michigan Sprawl Increases Waistlines, Health Care
Costs, MICH. LAND USE INSTITUTE, Mar. 31, 2003; SMART GROWTH AMERICA & SURFACE
TRANSPORTATION POLICY PROJECT, MEASURING THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF SPRAWL (2003)
(finding that “[r]esidents of sprawling counties were likely to walk less during leisure time, weigh
more, and have a greater prevalence of hypertension than residents of compact counties”).
302

See generally David Goldberg, Sprawl vs. Small: When Can Johnny Walk to School Again,
LAND
USE
INSTITUTE,
Sept.
16,
2005,
available
at
MICHIGAN
http://mlui.org/print.asp?fileid=16920.
303

Between 1969 and 2001, the percentage of students who commuted to school by foot or bicycle
decline from approximately 50% to 10%, while childhood obesity rose to 30%. Id. In one county
study, “57% of school principals rated the area around their schools as moderately to extremely
dangerous for kids on foot or bicycle.” Id. (citing study by Dekalb County Health Department).
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Scientists: California, St. Louis Risk Katrina-Level Floods, USA TODAY, Feb. 10, 2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/2006-02-19-flooding_x.htm?POE=click-refer.
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Id. (quoting presentation of Jeffrey Mount, University of California, at annual conference of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science).
306

See Richmond, supra note 296, at 20.
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economic and racial segregation of residential neighborhoods. As early as 1968,
the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders recognized a connection
between land use patterns and racial segregation.307 Anecdotal subjective
evidence suggests that, for some, sprawl may lead to a decline in community
welfare and individual happiness.308 These subjective claims are bolstered by
objective data indicating that sprawl-induced traffic congestion may cost
Americans seventy-two billion dollars annually in lost time and fuel309 and over
two hundred lives annually that are lost to road rage.310 Popular support for antisprawl measures also suggests widespread dissatisfaction with sprawling
development.311
2.

Defending Sprawl Regulations

Among the measures taken by local governments today to curb sprawl,
zoning regulations are perhaps the most common. For example, in response to the
trend toward the “supersizing” of houses, some municipalities have amended their
zoning ordinances to set maximum limits on square footage or lot coverage.312
307

The report suggested,
Most new employment opportunities . . . are being created in suburbs and
outlying areas—and this trend is likely to continue indefinitely. . . . [The
exclusion of blacks from this emerging suburban work force would become] the
single most important source of poverty among Negroes [and a principle source
of family and social disorganization.]

REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION
cited in Richmond, supra, at n.127.

ON

CIVIL DISORDERS (Bantam Books 1968),
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See, e.g., Letter to the Editor, USA TODAY, June 4, 2002, at A12 (claiming, that “[u]nchecked
sprawl has worsened environmental conditions, has bred a wasteland of mega-marts and malls
and, frankly, has diminished the quality of life”); Dowling, supra note, at 874 n.18 (concluding
that “unchecked sprawl has shifted from an engine of California’s growth to a force that now
threatens to inhibit growth and degrade the quality of our life”) (citing study sponsored by the
Bank of America, California Resources Agency, Greenbelt Alliance, and the Low Income Fund);
David A. Dana, Existence Value and Federal Preservation Regulation, 28 HARV. ENVT’L L. REV.
3343 (2004).
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Dowling, supra note 293, at 875 (citing to report by Texas Transportation Institute) (finding
that “Washington, D.C. residents waste about seventy-six hours each year in traffic jams at a cost
of about $1260 per person.”).
310

Dowling, supra (citing to 1996 data reported by the AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety).

311

Dowling, supra, at 877 and n.24 (noting that voters in 1998 approved over 70% of the 240
sprawl-control ballot initiatives, and reporting comments in support of smart growth and open
space protection by 34 governors in 1998 inaugural remarks or “state of the state” speeches).
312

See Tom Kenworthy, Oversize Homes Wear Out Welcome, USA TODAY, Feb. 21, 2006
(describing Aspen, Colorado ban on homes exceeding 15,000 square feet, and Arlington County,
Virginia’s limitation of building footprint to 30% of lot).
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Zoning has also been used as a weapon against the proliferation of “big box”
stores, with their perceived ability to sap traditional downtowns of their economic
vitality.313 The legitimacy of zoning is well established, and challenges to sprawlpreventing restrictions have been largely unsuccessful.314
As early as 1926, the Supreme Court upheld the authority of local
communities to enact comprehensive zoning ordinances.315 Ironically, traditional
zoning fostered the very type of low-density, use-separating, sprawling
development that modern regulations seek to prevent. For example, in Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, the 1974 Court upheld in poetic terms the government’s
discretion to promote the kind of development that some today might criticize as
sprawl:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor
vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project
addressed to family needs. . . . The police power is not confined to
elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay
out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of
quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people. .
. .316
Later, zoning ordinances would be used by some communities to limit undesirable
sprawling development. Almost thirty years ago, the Court specifically endorsed
sprawl prevention as a valid objective of zoning. In Agins v. City of Tiburon, the
Court upheld the authority of government to address “air, noise and water
pollution, traffic congestion, destruction of scenic beauty, disturbance of the
ecology and environment, hazards related to geology, fire and flood, and other
demonstrated consequences of urban sprawl.”317
313

See Symposium 2005: The Big Box Challenge, 6 VERMONT J. ENVT’L L. (2004-2005).
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See generally, Dowling, supra 293, at 884 (2000); Lora A. Lucero & Harrison T. Higgins,
Citizens Taking Matters into Their Own Hands, 37 URB. LAW. 607 (2005); Chris J. Williams, Do
Smart Growth Policies Invite Regulatory Takings Challenges? A Survey of Smart Growth and
Regulatory Takings in the Southeastern United States, 55 ALA. L. REV. 895 (2004); Robert H.
Freilich, Time, Space, and Value in Inverse Condemnation: A Unified Theory for Partial Takings
Analysis, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 589 (2002); James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, Smart Growth
and Limits on Government Powers: Effecting Nature, Markets and the Quality of Life under the
Takings and Other Provisions, DICK J. ENVT’L L. & POL’Y 421 (2001); William W. Buzbee,
Sprawl’s Dynamics: A Comparative Institutional Analysis Critique, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509
(2000). But see Richmond, supra note 296.
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Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding local zoning
ordinance as valid exercise of authority and rejecting facial attack).
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Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding village’s goals as permissible
exercise of police power).
317

Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980) (asserting that it has “long . . . been
recognized as legitimate [for local governments to regulate] the premature and unnecessary
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Following the lead of the Supreme Court, many lower courts have upheld
sprawl-control measures against challenges brought under the fifth amendment
and under a variety of other constitutional theories. In cases where the
government has prevailed, courts generally emphasize the nuisance-like aspects of
sprawl, concluding that the government has ample authority for its prevention. In
cases decided before Lingle,318 this type of analysis is particularly pronounced,
with some courts conflating the issues of whether a particular ordinance is a valid
exercise of governmental authority, and whether the exercise of such authority
constitutes a regulatory taking.319 After Lingle, courts have continued to support
the validity of sprawl control measures.320 In a closely-watched California case,
for example, the City of Turlock adopted a zoning ordinance clearly aimed at
preventing the development of a Wal-Mart store.321 In rejecting Wal-Mart’s
challenge to the ordinance, the court noted with approval the legislative purposes
of “protect[ing] against urban/suburban decay, increased traffic, and reduced air
quality, all of which, according to the City, can result from the development of
discount superstores.”322

conversion of open-space land to urban uses”), disapproved on other grounds, First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). See also Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. TRPA, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (holding that moratorium on
development imposed during the process of devising a comprehensive land-use plan does not
constitute a per se taking of property requiring compensation under the Takings Clause of the
United States Constitution).
318

See supra Part II.D.
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See, e.g., Windward Marina v. City of Destin, 743 So.2d 635, 639-40 (Fla. App. 1999)
(rejecting takings challenge to denial of permit to construct dry-dock marina, and evaluating
resultant increased boat traffic in context of nuisance law); Loretto Development Co., Inc. v.
Village of Chardon, 149 F.3d 1183 (6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished opinion) (rejecting takings
challenge to denial of landowner’s proposal to re-zone property to permit construction of WalMart store); Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting
takings challenge to zoning ordinance preventing landowners from building home in forest use
zone, and citing with approval governmental interest in protecting commercial timber practices
against the adverse consequences of sprawl).
320

See, e.g., Peste v. Mason County, 136 P.3d 140, 144, 150 (Wash. App. 2006) (rejecting takings
challenge to denial of rezoning petition to allow increased residential density, and noting with
approval county’s goal of reducing sprawl).
321

See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock, 138 Cal. App. 4th 273 (2006) (rejecting police
power and state law challenge to zoning ordinance). The challenged zoning provision “would limit
the ability of ‘big box’ retailers to sell nontaxable items such as groceries.” Id. at 280.
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Id. at 281, 301. See also In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 207 A.2d 397 (Vt. 1997) (upholding
Vermont’s Act 250).
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3.

Sprawl Protection as Offensive Claim

A public way is obstructed just as effectively by a pattern of low-density
development that over time generates more auto trips than roads can handle, as
by an ox cart abandoned in the middle of a road.323

Sprawl presents a more tenuous case for nuisance than does wetland
destruction. Unlike the latter—which may even support an affirmative action for
nuisance abatement—in the case of sprawl it may be difficult to trace causation
and to prove sufficient injury for standing. As one commentator has noted,
“[traditional] nuisances hurtled directly and immediately across property lines and
substantially harmed a clearly identifiable, usually adjacent, rural landowner and
perhaps a few others.”324 In contrast, this commentator notes, “a subdivision or
shopping mall at the metropolitan fringe affects people in the interior from a
considerable distance, in an indirect manner . . . and affects many people a little
instead of one or a few people a great deal.”325 Even if these problems of injury
and causation can be overcome, the very pervasiveness and success of land use
regulations such as zoning poses hurdles to the affirmative nuisance suit.
Otherwise viable common law actions may be preempted by complementary
legislative efforts to curb sprawl.326
C.

Global Warming as New Nuisance
1.

The New Learning on Global Warming

As the composition of the earth’s atmosphere changes, more of the sun’s
energy is trapped rather than radiated back into space.327 This change is brought
about by the emission of so-called “greenhouse gases,” including carbon dioxide,
nitrous oxide, methane, hydroflourocarbons, sulphur hexafluouride, and
perfluorochloride.328 About seventy-five percent of the carbon dioxide emitted by
323

Richmond, supra note 296, at 577-78 (2001) (arguing that “[p]ublic health is threatened just as
much by airborne emissions from millions of tailpipes as by the airborne germs from rotting hog
carcasses or a malarial pond”).
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Id. 577-78 (2001).

325

Id.
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Id. (arguing that the “apparently slam-dunk nuisance lawsuit is not viable because state
legislatures have supplanted common-law nuisance principles with sprawl zoning. The argument
would have to be that because 1920s style zoning does not attempt to assess the metro-wide
impacts of many modern land uses, zoning statutes do not pre-empt nuisance claims”).
327

See generally, Environmental Protection Agency, Global Warming, available at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf.
328

The first three greenhouse gases occur both naturally and as byproducts of human activities,
whereas the remaining three gases are not naturally occurring. Id. at Global Warming—Emissions.
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humans during the past two decades can be attributed to the burning of fossil fuels
(primarily by automobiles and power plants), with additional emissions
attributable to deforestation and other land use changes.329
Perhaps the best scientific consensus on climate change (including global
warming) is provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization and the United
Nations Environment Programme.330 The IPCC has issued a series of “assessment
reports,” the most recent of which was released in summary form in February
2007.331
Although the human causes of global warming are subject to a measure of
dispute, they have been identified with an increasing degree of confidence over
time. In 2001, the IPCC asserted that although natural factors have made “small
contributions” to global warming, “concentrations of atmospheric greenhouse
gases and their radiative forcing have continued to increase as a result of human
activities.”332 In response, in 2001 the United States agreed that the increase in
surface air temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures over the past several
decades “are likely mostly due to human activities,” but added, “we cannot rule
out that some significant part of these changes is also a reflection of natural
variability.”333 The IPCC’s subsequent report, Climate Change 2007, concluded,
“[t]he understanding of anthropogenic warming and cooling influences on climate
has improved since the Third Assessment Report, . . . leading to very high
confidence that the globally averaged net effect of human activities since 1750 has
been one of warming. . . .”334 The IPCC added that the rate of increase of radiative
forcing during the industrial era “due to increases in carbon dioxide, methane, and
nitrous oxide . . . is very likely to have been unprecedented in more than 10,000
years.”335
329

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis 7
(2001).
330

Cite.

331

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science
Basis: Summary for Policymakers (approved February 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/.
332

Climate Change 2001, supra note 329, at 6-9 (defining “radiative forcing as “a measure of the
influence a factor has in altering the balance of incoming and outgoing energy in the Earthatmosphere system, and [as] an index of the importance of the factor as a potential climate change
mechanism”). See also id. at 10 (asserting, “[t]here is new and stronger evidence that most of the
warming observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities”).
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NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY
QUESTIONS 1 (2001).
334

Climate Change 2007, supra note 331, at 3 (emphasis in original).
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Id. (emphasis in original).
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The IPCC predicts a variety of climate changes by the end of the twentyfirst century, including an average surface temperature increase of 1.8 to 4.0
degrees centigrade, and a rise of global mean sea level of 0.18 to 0.59 meters.336
Moreover, the IPCC finds that increases in tropical cyclone (typhoon and
hurricane) wind and precipitation intensities are “likely.”337
2.

Defending Climate Regulations

As discussed in the previous two sections, wetland destruction and land
use patterns are regulated by well-developed legislative schemes under the Clean
Water Act and local zoning ordinances, respectively. Those seeking to avoid such
regulation have claimed, inter alia, that it constitutes a regulatory taking for
which compensation is required—a claim that may be refuted in some cases by a
new nuisance defense. Surprisingly, this same pattern has not appeared in the
context of global warming regulation.338 That is, opponents of the emerging law
have not challenged it under the fifth amendment regulatory takings doctrine.339
The most obvious explanation for this absence of takings litigation is quite
simple: there is little or no regulation in existence to serve as the target of a
challenge, either at the federal or state levels. In fact, at the federal level, it is
those who support regulation—and not property rights advocates opposing it—
who have filed suit. For example, in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection
Agency340 the issue is whether the states and others can compel the federal
336

Id. at 11 (predicting changes at years 2090-2099 relative to 1980-1999).
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Id. at 7, 12. See also P.J. Webster et al., Changes in Tropical Cyclone Number, Duration, and
Intensity in a Warming Environment, 309 SCIENCE 1844 (Sept. 16, 2005) (concluding that “global
data indicate a 30-year trend toward more frequent and intense hurricanes,” and that “[t]his trend is
not inconsistent with recent climate model simulations that a doubling of CO2 may increase the
frequency of the most intense cyclones, although attribution of the 30-year trends to global
warming would require a longer global data record and, especially, a deeper understanding of the
role of hurricanes in the general circulation of the atmosphere and ocean”).
338

See supra notes and accompanying text.
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For a summary of the global warming lawsuits pending as of February 5, 2007, see Justin R.
Pidot, Global Warming in the Courts (Georgetown Environmental Law & Policy Institute) (Nov.
2006
&
Feb.
5,
2007
Supp.),
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/current_research/global_warming_litigation/global
(last
visited Feb. 10, 2007). The regulation of air pollutants released into the global commons may
differ conceptually from the regulation of wetlands filling or other uses of private property.
Nevertheless, the regulation of air pollution may also serve as the basis for a regulatory taking
claim. See, e.g., D.A.B.E., Inc. v. City of Toledo, 393 F.3d 692 (Fed. App. 2005) (rejecting
takings challenge by restaurant and bar owners to city ordinance restricting smoking in enclosed
public places).
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Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert.
granted, 126 S.Ct. 2960 (2006). Twelve states and others brought an action challenging the
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) denial of a petition under § 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air
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government to regulate greenhouse gases, not whether any such regulation would
run afoul of the takings doctrine.
Thus, it may be simply too soon for takings litigation to have materialized,
particularly “as-applied” rather than “facial” challenges. As an alternative
explanation, could it be possible that regulatory takings challenges will never pose
a significant hurdle to global warming legislation? That is, as the science on
climate change develops, it becomes increasingly apparent that those who pollute
the atmosphere with greenhouse gases are unleashing nuisance-like harms upon
society. As a result, the new nuisance doctrine of Lucas may become an
increasingly powerful affirmative defense to developing regulation.
This hypothesis may be supported by industry’s reaction to California’s
pioneering effort to regulate greenhouse gases at the state level. Many in the
regulated community do not challenge the conclusion that greenhouse gas
emissions should be regulated; instead, through preemption claims they raise the
issue of which authority (federal or state) should oversee the regulation. For
example, in Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Witherspoon, automobile
manufacturers challenged California’s 2004 adoption of vehicle emission
regulations for greenhouse gases, claiming that the state’s action had been
preempted by various federal statutes and that the new emission standards would
usurp the Federal Transportation Department’s authority to regulate fuel
economy.341 Beyond the vehicle emission legislation of 2004, California also
enacted groundbreaking state-wide emission caps for stationary as well as mobile
sources, through the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006.342 At least by year’s
end, the statute had not been challenged in the courts.343 Instead, some have called
for similar legislation to be enacted on a nationwide scale.

Act, seeking the regulation of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions from new motor
vehicles. In holding that the EPA properly exercised its discretion in denying the rulemaking
petition, the D.C. Circuit concluded that Congress gave the agency considerable discretion under §
202(a)(1) to utilize not only scientific evidence, but also policy judgments in deciding whether or
not to regulate specific pollutants. In so concluding, the court cited to a 2001 statement by the
National Research Council that “‘a causal linkage’ between greenhouse gas emissions and global
warming ‘cannot be unequivocally established.’” The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument on
November 29, 2006, and a decision is expected spring 2007.
341

2006 WL 2734359 (E.D.Cal. 2006) (denying state defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim). On January 17, 2007, the district court stayed further proceedings pending the
Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted,
126 S.Ct. 2960 (2006). See 2007 WL 135688 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
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A.B. 32 (Aug. 30, 2006) (applying emission caps to power plants, oil refineries, cement plants,
large dairies, and other major industrial sources).
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For other preemption litigation see Lincoln Dodge, Inc. v. Sullivan, No. 1:06CV00070 (D. R.I.
filed Feb. 13, 2006) (alleging that Energy Policy and Conservation Act and the implied federal
foreign affairs power preempt state regulation of motor vehicle emissions); Green Mountain
Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge v. Torti, No. 2:05CV00302 (D. Vt. filed Nov. 18, 2005) (alleging that
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3.

Climate Protection as Offensive Claim

Climate protection advocates have filed a series of lawsuits challenging
atmospheric pollution as nuisance. Although plaintiffs face numerous procedural
and substantive hurdles, they are “’edging closer’ to at least establishing standing
to pursue such actions.”344 Although the likelihood of success is still small, the
stakes are enormous. As one practitioner notes, “The prospect of liability is a
serious matter. . . . Even if the risk appears to be small in terms of the likelihood
of being found liable, the consequences of being held liable are substantial—
potentially in the trillions of dollars.”345
Three cases are noteworthy. First, because the appellants in Massachusetts
v. EPA had been unsuccessful before the D.C. Circuit in forcing the EPA to
regulate carbon dioxide emissions,346 they brought an offensive nuisance claim as
an alternative avenue of relief. In Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co.,
many of the same states and environmental organizations again sought to abate
global warming, this time terming it a public nuisance.347 Plaintiffs targeted five
public utility companies as defendants, alleging that they emit one fourth of the
carbon dioxide in the United States, and therefore contribute significantly to
climate change.348 Plaintiffs sought a complicated remedy, asking the court to set
a cap on each defendant’s emission of carbon dioxide, as well as set an emission

Energy Policy and Conservation Act and the implied federal foreign affairs power preempt state
regulation of motor vehicle emissions).
344

Kristin Choo, Feeling the Heat: The Growing Debate Over Climate Change Takes on Legal
Overtones, ABA J. 29, 34 (July 2006) (quoting J. Kevin Healy, environmental lawyer in Bryan
Cave’s New York City office).
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Id. (quoting John C. Dernbach, co-chair, Sustainable Development, Ecosystems and Climate
Change Committee, ABA Section of Environment, Energy and Resources). Dernbach’s
observations are reminiscent of Judge Learned Hand’s articulation of the so-called “Carroll
Towing Formula,” under which a defendant’s duty in tort is a function of three variables: the
probability of harm, the gravity of harm, and the burden of adequate precautions. United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2nd Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.) (holding barge company liable in
negligence for damage occurring when barge broke away from its mooring during daylight hours
when no attendant was aboard the ship). Extrapolating broadly to the context of global warming,
the greater the body of evidence that catastrophic climate change is likely to occur, the more
reasonable it becomes to impose liability upon atmospheric polluters.
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Massachusetts v. EPA, supra notes and accompanying text.
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Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., 406 F.Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing
action as non-justiciable political question), appeal pending, Case No. 05-5104-CV (2nd Cir.). See
generally, Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVT’L L.
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Connecticut v. AEP, 406 F. Supp. 2d at.
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reduction schedule.349 The court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss on the
ground that climate change as a public nuisance is a non-justiciable political
question.350 Nevertheless, the court provided instructive language suggesting
weaknesses that future environmental plaintiffs might overcome to prosecute
successful nuisance actions—indicating that the relief sought was overbroad,
revealing the “transcendently legislative nature of [the] litigation.”351
Two additional cases are more promising for an ultimate recognition of
climate change as public nuisance, ruling in favor of environmental plaintiffs on
the standing-related issues of injury-in-fact, causation and redressability. In
Friends of the Earth v. Watson,352 plaintiffs/environmental organizations alleged
that defendants353 had provided assistance to particular projects that contribute to
climate change without complying with the National Environmental Policy Act
and the Administrative Procedure Act. The court found that plaintiffs had
standing, noting that a more lenient standard should be applied in cases alleging
procedural statutory violations.354 Similarly, Northwest Environmental Defense
Center v. Owens Corning Corporation held that environmental plaintiffs had
standing to challenge alleged violations of the Clean Air Act that could promote
349

Id.. This request would have required defendants to comply with emissions caps that parallel
the Kyoto Protocol, which was not ratified by the United States. Id.
350

Id.

351

Id. at 265 (describing prayer for court to “enjoin[] each of the defendants to abate its
contribution to the nuisance by capping its emissions of carbon dioxide and then reducing those
emissions by a specified percentage each year for at least a decade”). See also In Re: Methyl
Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Products Liability Litigation, 2006 WL 1980639, *5-6 (S.D.N.Y.
June 23, 2006) (denying defendant gasoline producers’ motion to dismiss on basis of political
question doctrine, and distinguishing Connecticut v. AEP as a case in which plaintiffs sought
quasi-legislative relief when Congress and the Executive had specifically refused to act);
Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Owens Corning Corp., 2006 WL 1594130 at *11 (D.
Or. June 8, 2006) (distinguishing Connecticut v. AEP as a case where the court was asked “to
make a free-wheeling policy choice and decide whether global warming is, or is not, a serious
threat or what measures should be taken to remedy that problem”).
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Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Watson, 2005 WL 2035596 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005) (denying
defendants’ motion for summary judgment).
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Defendants are Peter Watson, Chief Executive Officer of the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC), and Peter Merrill, Vice Chairman and First Vice President of the ExportImport Bank of the United States (Ex-Im). As the court explained, “OPIC, an independent
government corporation, offers insurance and loan guarantees for projects in developing countries.
. . . Ex-Im, an independent governmental agency and wholly-owned government corporation,
provides financing support for exports from the United States.” Id. (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 2197(a)).
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See id. at *2 (“When, as here, a plaintiff seeks to challenge a procedural violation, some
uncertainty about redressability and causality is allowed.”); see also id. at *3 (“Here, any concern
that Plaintiffs’ asserted injuries are caused by third parties must be evaluated in light of lower
threshold for causation in procedural injury cases.”).
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global warming.355 The court found that plaintiffs had adequately demonstrated
causation, even though they relied upon indirect links between cause and effect.356
In declining to adopt a narrow view of standing, the court rejected the notion—
derived from the special injury rule of public nuisance—that “injury to all is
injury to none.”357 Under that view, the court explained, “if the proposed action
threatened the very survival of our species, no person would have standing to
contest it. The greater the threatened harm, the less power the courts would have
to intercede. That is an illogical proposition.”358
4.

New Learning on Global Warming as Legislative Catalyst

When the potential threat of climate change first came to the national
attention, many in government and industry responded with denial. International
efforts to draft and ratify the Kyoto Protocol highlight this opposition in the
United States to aggressive regulation. The Clinton administration ultimately
agreed through the Kyoto Protocol to reduce U.S. emissions seven percent below
1990 levels, to be achieved by 2012.359 During its negotiations, however, the
administration introduced several stumbling blocks that would continue to be
hallmarks of U.S. policy through successive administrations. These hurdles
355

Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Owens Corning Corp., 434 F.Supp. 2d 957 (D.Or.
June 8, 2006) (upholding standing in action alleging violations of Clean Air Act § 165(a)).
356

The court noted,
Other forecasted impacts from [defendant’s] emissions would operate less
directly. For instance, ozone-depleting emissions from Defendant’s facility must
first ascend to the stratosphere before impacting persons on the ground in
Oregon. Global warming likewise operates indirectly. Higher sea levels in
Oregon will supposedly result from melting ice in the earth’s polar regions. . . .
Nevertheless, the adverse effects alleged in Plaintiffs’ Complaint would be felt
by them here in Oregon, and the source of Defendant’s emissions would be in
Oregon.

Id. at *6, *8 (recognizing more lenient requirement of causation in context of motion to dismiss
for lack of standing than in context of merits of tort action).
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Id. at *6.
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Id. See also California v. General Motors Corp., No. 3:06CV05755 (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 20,
2006) (asserting nuisance claim against manufacturer of motor vehicles); Comer v. Murphy Oil,
2006 WL 1474089 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 19, 2006) (asserting third amended complaint in nuisance
against oil and gas companies, claiming that their greenhouse gas emissions exacerbated the
damage caused by Hurricane Katrina).
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DONALD A. BROWN, AMERICAN HEAT: ETHICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE UNITED STATES’
RESPONSE TO GLOBAL WARMING 35 (2002). The author had been “a former liaison of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency to the United Nations from 1995 to 1998, a member of several
U.S. delegations to UN negotiations on environmental and development issues, and a long-time
observer of the U.S. role in international environmental issues. . . .” Id. at xv.

65

included policy options to reduce the economic impact of compliance, as well as
demanding that all nations (both developed and developing) agree to the
Protocol.360 The George W. Bush administration rejected the treaty, citing to
scientific uncertainty, as well as to the factors mentioned by the Clinton
administration.361 For its part, the Senate refused to ratify the Protocol.362 A
prominent senator stated, for example, “[a]ny way you measure this, this is a bad
deal for America.”363 Similarly, another senator would later denounce the threat
of catastrophic global warming as “the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the
American people.”364 Industry, too, mounted an attack on the Protocol, airing
commercials that “showed a scissors cutting those countries out of a world map
that would not have enforceable emissions targets . . . [thereby suggesting] that a
Kyoto treaty would unfairly exempt these nations.”365 Several years later industry
would engage in another memorable television advertising campaign, this time in
response to the movie, An Inconvenient Truth. 366 Showing an attractive, pigtailed
young girl blowing onto a dandelion stalk to scatter its seeds, the narrator states,
“[carbon dioxide] is essential to life [because] we breathe it out.” The narrator
concludes, referring to carbon dioxide, “They call it pollution. We call it life.”367
Over time, there has been a reversal of attitudes among political and
industrial leaders about the seriousness of the threat posed by global warming. In
response, some have called for governmental measures to encourage voluntary
efforts to protect the global atmosphere. For example, in 2005 Senator Chuck
Hagel—a staunch opponent of the Kyoto Protocol—introduced three legislative
bills to spur the development of clean-energy technologies.368 He stopped well
360
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Id. at 37 (quoting Senator Chuck Hagel, R-Neb).
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http://Inhofe.senate.gov/pressreleases/climateupdate.htm (visited Feb. 11, 2007).
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BROWN, supra note 359, at 33 (describing “an industry coalition of oil companies, electric
utilities, automobile manufacturers, and farm groups . . . [that] launched a multi-million-dollar
advertising campaign to generate public opposition to a Kyoto treaty”).
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See Competitive Enterprise Institute, We Call It Life (showing clip of “Energy,” a “60-second
television spot[] [to be aired from May 18 to May 28, 2006] focusing on the alleged global
warming crisis and the calls by some environmental groups and politicians for reduced energy
use”), http://streams.cei.org/ (visited May 25, 2006).
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See Amanda Griscom Little, The Chuck Stops Here: An Interview with Senator Chuck Hagel,
Republican from Nebraska, on His New Climate Bills, GRIST, Mar. 2005,
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short of endorsing mandatory emission caps, however, relying instead upon
voluntary public-private partnerships and upon incentives to industry.369
Similarly, commenting on the release of Climate Change 2007,370 the Bush
administration embraced the report, but indicated that it would continue to rely
primarily upon voluntary methods to address the problem.371 Also promoting
voluntary efforts, Wal-Mart launched a broad sustainability campaign in 2006.
Among other things, the effort seeks to double the efficiency of its vehicle fleet in
ten years, and to reduce the energy use in its stores by thirty percent.372
Some have gone even farther, seeking mandatory regulation of
atmospheric pollution contributing to climate change. For example, some
politicians have called for the prompt enactment of mandatory caps on U.S.
greenhouse gas emissions.373 Increasingly, industry has supported such calls. In a
move that would have been largely unthinkable just a decade ago, a coalition of
prominent businesses and environmental groups—the United States Climate
Action Partnership—has recently called on the federal government to quickly
enact strong national legislation to require significant reductions of greenhouse
gas emissions.374
http://www.grist.org/news/maindish/2005/03/01/hagel/ (visited Feb. 11, 2007). With respect to his
position on climate change treaties, the Senator asserted,
My position has been very consistent. In 1997, I introduced the Byrd-Hagel
Resolution, and if you read that it says two things: the Senate would not ratify
any climate-change treaty that does not include developing nations and does
harm to the U.S. economy. So I’m right where I was in 1997, and that’s
reflected in the legislation that I introduced. I’ve always said that climate change
is a cycle of the world. We’ve always had extreme swings in climate, long
before there was a combustion engine or a great population of human beings in
the world.
Id.
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“Groundbreaking” Legislation, 38 BNA ENV’T REPORTER, Jan. 26, 2007; Dean Scott, Senators
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Feb. 2, 2007.See also Climate Change, Congressional Research Service Comparison of Key
Provisions of Greenhouse Gas Reduction Bills Introduced in 110th Congress, BNA DAILY ENV’T
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Undoubtedly, a constellation of factors has prompted this growing
acceptance of mandatory legislation. Foremost among them, perhaps, is the new
scientific learning about the threats and causes of climate change—embodied in
prominent reports such as Climate Change 2001 and Climate Change 2007.375 As
the knowledge base increases, society’s reaction may change from that of
“environmental cynicism” to that of “environmental connectivity.”376 As a result,
the new nuisance has evolved in the context of global warming. Through
offensive nuisance law suits, courts have increasingly been asked to expand the
conventional wisdom on cause and effect.377 As an attorney from one prominent
law firm has surmised, “successful common law nuisance suits can spur
legislative action. . . . Today’s global warming nuisance suits could have the
effect of encouraging Congress to adopt more comprehensive legislative solutions
a few years from now.”378
CONCLUSION: TOWARD THE THIRD INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION?
Lucas purported to establish a new bright-line threshold of takings
liability, triggered when regulation deprives landowners of all economically
beneficial use.379 Ironically, however, the “new nuisance” defense has proved to
be more enduring than the rule. As one commentator stated, what Justice Scalia
“hoped to serve as a per se takings rule proves, in its practical operation, to work
more often as a per se no takings rule.”380 As a result of the new rule and defense
of Lucas, courts have placed a renewed emphasis upon a broad balancing of
public and private interests. Drawing upon the long tradition of nuisance law,
courts weigh factors as concrete as market value and as ephemeral as
happiness.381 As an opinion from the D.C. Circuit stated, courts have returned to a
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Electric, Lehman Brothers, Natural Resources Defense Council, Pew Center on Global Climate
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“gestalt approach” that evaluates both the purpose and desired effect of
governmental regulation.382
Perhaps the broader lesson from Lucas and its progeny is that the public
interest—and its supporting regulations—cannot be circumscribed by a single
measure as narrow as the economic impact of regulation upon landowners.
Rather, as recognized long ago by Penn Central, economic impact is but one
factor that societies should consider in a just and equitable distribution of the
burdens of modern life.383 Courts should identify all of the impacts of an action—
in accordance with changed circumstances and new learning—in determining
whether such action may be regulated without compensation in the name of the
public interest. In this context, the reincorporation of nuisance into the law of
regulatory takings levels the playing field between public and private interests. By
examining cause-effect relationships, nuisance is capable of defusing the modern
one-sided rhetoric of rights that portrays landowners as the victims of government
regulators, even when those landowners generate negative externalities that spill
over into neighboring communities.
The legacy of Lucas may go far beyond the context of regulatory takings
in particular, and litigation in general. Instead, innovators are beginning to see
more potential profit in fighting global warming than in fighting the government’s
increasingly-likely regulation of global warming. The first and second industrial
revolutions brought new technologies to England and the United States,
respectively,384—including the “spinning Jenny,” the “water frame,” the steam
engine, and the locomotive.385 Some claim that a “third industrial revolution” may
now be underway, fueled by the development of technological solutions to
increasingly prominent environmental challenges such as providing sustainable
energy and addressing global warming.386 Banking on this entrepreneurial spirit,
British billionaire Richard Branson and former vice president Al Gore announced
a contest to remove at least one billion tons of carbon dioxide annually from the

extreme danger to the life, property and happiness of others); 17 Maine Revised Statutes § 2802
(defining nuisance to include the discarding of motor vehicles in a manner “injurious to the
comfort and happiness of individuals and the public”).
382

See supra note and accompanying text.

383

See supra note.

384

See supra Part III.A.

385

See Schools History, Inventions that Fueled the Industrial Revolution,
http://www.schoolshistory.org.uk/IndustrialRevolution/inventions.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2007).
386

See Moises Velasquez-Manoff, Unions See Greenbacks in “Green” Future: Organized Labor
is Joining Forces with Environmentalists to Push for an Eco-Friendly Economy, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 25, 2007.
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atmosphere.387 As a prize, Branson has offered twenty-five million dollars.388
Looking at the related potential for developing clean, renewable energy sources to
achieve national energy independence, one analysis by environmental and labor
organizations predicts that an annual investment of thirty billion dollars for ten
years would trigger the creation of 3.3 million jobs and a $1.4 million increase in
the gross domestic product.389 In at least a small measure, perhaps these
developments can be attributed to Lucas’s unintentional reinvigoration of
nuisance law, with its concomitant examination of the actions that threaten critical
environmental resources.
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